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The community benefit standard for nonprofit hospital tax exemption is the touchstone 
for nonprofit form of organization of healthcare providers. For hospitals and health systems, is 
the sine qua non of nonprofit status. Under IRS regulations not for profit healthcare providers 
must satisfy this standard to maintain their exemption. Despite its importance, the standard as it 
currently exists is highly problematic. It was established with limited public discussion or policy 
deliberation and in a time when the healthcare industry was very differently constituted than it is 
today. Due to the drastic changes which have accrued in the decades since the community benefit 
standard was established, as well as the more recent dramatic changes brought about by the 
affordable care act, a reexamination of the community benefit standard for nonprofit hospital tax 
exemption is timely.  
 This dissertation will consist of three papers. The first of these is a review article. It is 
entitled "Tax-Exempt Hospitals and Community Benefit: New Directions in Policy and Practice" 
and co-authored with Simone Rauscher Singh and Gary Young. This piece was an invited article 
for the Annual Review of Public Health. Currently, a draft of the paper, revised on the basis of 
peer review comments, has been resubmitted to the journal. This article first lays out the 
historical and legal development of the community benefit standard for nonprofit hospital tax 
exemption in the United States. It then introduces the various controversies that exist 
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surrounding the adequacy of tax-exempt hospitals' current provision of community benefits to 
the populations they are supposed to serve. This is followed by a discussion of recent legal and 
policy developments surrounding tax-exemption of nonprofit hospitals, including how expanded 
reporting, new exemption requirements and a recent increase in litigation over community 
benefit at the state and local level have reshaped the environment for the nonprofit sector. 
Finally, the paper lays out future policy directions for community benefit and tax exempt 
hospitals. 
 The second paper of the dissertation is entitled "Evaluating Hospitals’ Provision of 
Community Benefit: An Argument for an Outcome-Based Approach to Nonprofit Hospital Tax 
Exemption."  It was co-authored with Simone Rauscher Singh and Peter D. Jacobson. It was 
published in the American Journal of Public Health in April of 2013. The article argues that 
expanding the current input-based reporting requirement to include not only monetary inputs but 
also population health outcomes would achieve greater benefit for society. The article first 
provides an introduction to the role that nonprofit hospitals play in our society and then explains 
the history and development of the community benefit standard. It then suggests that the 
community benefit standard, as it is currently constituted, encourages hospitals to have an undue 
focus on monetary inputs. It argues that we instead adopt a modified approach based on both 
input and outcome measures would require hospitals to design community-benefit programs that 
make a measurable difference in the health of their respective communities. It then proceeds to 
identify possible challenges which could be faced by an outcome based approach to community 
benefit.  
 The final chapter of this dissertation is a law review article. It is provisionally entitled 
"An Outcome Based Approach to Nonprofit Hospital Tax Exemption."  It argues that an 
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outcome-oriented approach to community benefit could provide a better regulatory model for 
nonprofit hospital tax exemption. The first part of this chapter is devoted to the current legal 
standard for tax-exemption of nonprofit hospitals. It relates in detail the historical development 
of the community benefit standard and how that development was mired by path dependences 
and lack of thoroughgoing policy analysis. It then examines the various theories that have been 
put forward to justify the nonprofit form. This is followed by an exploration of the case law that 
has been generated by litigation over hospitals community benefit obligations. Finally, the first 
section concludes with a review of the empirical literature. The second section of the article puts 
forward a new, outcome-oriented approach to community benefit and then explores its 
application to this area of law. It does so by first examining competing alternative models for 
community benefit reform, then exploring the strengths and weakness of an outcome-oriented 
approach. Next is an exploration of the policy ramifications of a such an approach. Finally, the 
new approach is applied to a number of illustrative cases to show how they could have been 




Tax-Exempt Hospitals and Community Benefit: New Directions in Policy and Practice 
 
Abstract 
The current community benefit standard for nonprofit hospital tax exemption has been 
the subject of mounting criticism. Many different constituencies have advanced the view that in 
its present form it fails to ensure that nonprofit hospitals provide adequate benefits to their 
communities in exchange for their tax exemption. In contrast, hospitals have often expressed the 
concern that the community benefit standard in its current form is vague and therefore difficult to 
comply with. A variety of suggestions have been made regarding how the existing community 
benefit standard could be improved or even replaced. In this article, we first discuss the historical 
and legal developments of the community benefit standard. We then present the key 
controversies that have emerged in recent years and the policy responses attempted thus far. 
Finally, we evaluate possible future policy directions which efforts at reform could follow. 
	  
Introduction 
 Nonprofit hospitals represent an important group of organizations in the United States. 
Nearly 60 percent of the approximately 5,000 acute care hospitals in the US are private, 
nonprofit entities (1). They are vital to the health and welfare of millions of Americans (64), and 
constitute a major portion of the US economy. Significantly, almost all nonprofit hospitals in the 
5 
 
US are exempt from paying federal, state, and local taxes. The Joint Committee on Taxation 
estimated that tax exemptions for all nonprofit hospitals totaled $12.6 billion in 2002, and the 
value of these exemptions have only grown since (23). About half of this amount is constituted 
of exemptions from federal income taxes. The rest is from state and local tax exemptions, which 
include income, property and sales taxes (64).  
In exchange for these tax exemptions, there exists a general expectation that nonprofit 
hospitals will provide community benefits. However, the amount and type of these benefits are a 
source of ongoing controversy involving policy makers, community groups, and tax-exempt 
hospitals (25, 46). Current tax exemption standards for nonprofit hospitals, both federal and 
local, are beset by certain inherent ambiguities. They also are out of step with the current health 
needs of communities and the market conditions faced by hospitals as most were designed for 
the healthcare environment as it existed several generations ago (56). Because of these 
limitations, current exemption standards pose compliance challenges for hospitals and, we argue, 
fail to ensure that hospitals provide adequate benefits to the communities they serve. A revision 
or replacement of the current tax-exemption standards for nonprofit hospitals is thus timely.  
 In this article, we first discuss the historical and legal development of the community 
benefit standard. We then present some of the controversies that have emerged over the existing 
community benefit standard as well as recent policy and legal developments which have arisen 
because of these controversies. Finally, we discuss and evaluate possible future policy directions 




Historical and Legal Development of the Community Benefit Standard 
 Nonprofit hospitals in the US qualify for tax exemption as charitable organizations. At 
the federal level, the United States Code title 26, Section 501, subsection (c), specifies charitable 
organizations as one of several types of entities that qualify for tax exemption (63). Nonprofit 
hospitals also qualify for tax exemption at the state and local level based on their charitable 
status (27, 36). Both federal and local standards for charitable organizations are largely grounded 
in the common law doctrine of charity (20). The common law meaning of charity is that it is for 
the benefit of an indefinite number of people (30). Public benefit thus is the essential feature 
justifying the special status of the charitable enterprise. 
Federal and local standards for determining whether a nonprofit hospital qualifies as a 
charitable organization have evolved over time. For many years, the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS), the federal agency that determines whether organizations qualify for federal tax 
exemption, required that nonprofit hospitals be “operated to the extent of [their] financial ability 
for those not able to pay for services rendered (31).” Thus, hospitals demonstrated their 
charitable nature by giving health care to people who were unable to pay (68). This was, in fact, 
the primary function of hospitals through the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Most hospitals at 
the time were religious, explicitly charitable organizations dedicated strictly to helping those 
without alternative sources of medical care. The wealthy, by contrast, received medical attention 
in their homes (59). However, even as medical technology expanded the clinical capabilities of 
hospitals so that they became an important source of care for non-indigent patients, hospitals’ tax 
exemption continued to be justified by their commitment to providing care to all individuals 
regardless of financial means (6). 	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 The creation of the country’s two largest public health insurance programs, Medicare and 
Medicaid, in the mid-1960s led to a change in the federal tax-exemption standard for nonprofit 
hospitals. At the time, many policy makers and health care analysts were of the opinion that 
these new federal programs would provide adequate insurance coverage to most of the country’s 
poor and thus significantly reduce the need for hospital-based charity care (12). This possibility 
raised questions as to what nonprofit hospitals would do in the future to qualify as charitable 
organizations for purposes of tax exemption. In 1969, the IRS introduced a new tax-exemption 
standard, the community benefit standard, for determining whether hospitals qualify as charitable 
organizations for purposes of I.R.C. Section 501(c)(3) (13, 32).1 This standard, still in use as of 
this writing, puts forth an expanded view of hospitals’ potential contributions to the communities 
they serve based on the concept that such institutions promote health. The standard includes the 
provision of charity care as only one of several exemption-related criteria:	  
• Operate a 24 hour emergency room; 	  
• Provide charity care to the extent of the hospital’s financial ability;	  
• Extend medical staff privileges to all qualified physicians in the area, consistent 
with the size and nature of the facility;	  
• Accept payment from Medicare and Medicaid programs on a non-discriminatory 
basis; and 	  
• Maintain a community-controlled board (i.e., a governing board with 
membership, by appointment, primarily from the local community).	  
	  
The standard does not require that each criterion be satisfied in all circumstances. 
Moreover, in 1983 the IRS issued a ruling holding that hospitals without emergency rooms could 
still be eligible for exemption under certain circumstances (33). By the early 1980s as well, 
predictions that the Medicare and Medicaid programs would largely eliminate the need for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 To qualify for tax-exempt status under I.R.C. 501(c) (3) entities must meet organizational and operational tests, the 
latter requiring that the entity be operated primarily to accomplish one of its exempt purposes. For hospitals, the 
community benefit standard is an element of the operational test. The operational test also prohibits private 




hospital-based charity care proved to be incorrect as a large population of uninsured individuals 
continued to exist in the US (40). As such, the provision of charity care continued to be seen by 
many policy makers, community leaders, and members of the general public as an important, if 
not the most important, community benefit activity of tax-exempt hospitals (6).	  
While the IRS’ community benefit standard serves as the federal requirement for the tax 
exemption of nonprofit hospitals, states are free to set their own requirements for exemption 
from state and local taxes. There is some variety among state and local standards, but certain 
larger trends are discernable. Many states have chosen to emulate the federal standard. Indeed, 
some states automatically grant tax-exempt status to any hospital that has been deemed by the 
IRS to be in compliance with the federal standard (11).  
Among the states that have departed from the federal standard, two trends have emerged. 
A handful of states, such as Nevada, Texas, and Virginia, have established minimum standards 
that all nonprofit hospitals must meet if they are to retain their tax- exempt status (41, 61, 67). 
Texas is widely regarded to have the most aggressive and detailed requirements. Texas law 
requires, inter alia, that charity care and shortfalls from government sponsored indigent-care 
programs equal at least four percent of hospitals' net patient revenue or, alternatively, one 
hundred percent of the value of the hospital's state tax exemption (62). The other broad trend at 
the state level is the increasing prevalence of mandated disclosures by hospitals of their 
community benefit activities to government agencies, and also, often the public at large. More 
than half of all states require that hospitals make some sort of disclosure of their community 




Controversy over Tax-Exempt Hospitals’ Provision of Community Benefits	  
 For at least the last 30 years, there has been much controversy regarding whether tax-
exempt hospitals meet their community benefit obligations as set out by federal and local 
standards (46). Policy makers and community leaders have often accused tax-exempt hospitals of 
providing inadequate community benefits, such as charity care (11). In addition, there have been 
related criticisms leveled at tax-exempt hospitals pertaining to their investments in for-profit 
business ventures, aggressive billing and debt collection practices, and compensation 
arrangements for senior administrators (24). The resulting controversy has sparked both 
governmental hearings and media scrutiny (19).  
A key consideration underlying this controversy is the fact that federal and most state and 
local exemption standards lack explicit criteria regarding what is expected of tax-exempt 
hospitals in terms of their management practices and community benefit activities. Moreover, no 
consensus exists on the primary rationale for why, as a society, we extend tax exemption to 
nonprofit hospitals. Some commentators contend that tax exemption should be seen as a quid pro 
quo between hospitals and communities thereby requiring hospitals to provide a certain amount 
of community benefit in exchange for tax exemption (70, 71). However, others believe nonprofit 
hospitals are deserving of tax exemption for embodying a fundamental charitable character that 
cannot be measured in financial terms or otherwise quantified (13, 50-52).  
The controversy over whether tax-exempt hospitals meet their community obligations has 
generated numerous empirical studies. Much of this research has provided only a partial picture 
of tax-exempt hospitals’ community benefits, mainly because of disagreement regarding what 
should count as a community benefit and the lack of adequate data (8, 48). A recent study, 
national in scope and based on 2009 IRS tax filings, found that tax-exempt hospitals devoted an 
10 
 
average of 7.5 percent of their expenditures to community benefits as defined by the IRS (69). Of 
these expenditures, more than 85 percent went toward charity care, government payer payment 
shortfalls, and subsidized health services. The remaining 15 percent went toward community 
health improvement activities, health professions education, and medical research. The level and 
composition of community benefits provided, however, varied widely both across hospitals and 
states (2, 3, 69). A related line of studies also compared the provision of community benefits 
between tax-exempt hospitals and investor-owned hospitals. On average, tax-exempt hospitals do 
appear to spend more on charity care as a percentage of their operating budgets than their 
investor-owned counterparts but the difference tends to be small. Additionally, the difference 
between tax-exempt and investor-owned hospitals appears to be even smaller when the 
comparison includes bad debt as well as charity care. Both tax-exempt and investor-owned 
hospitals incur bad debt that is attributable to treating patients who lack adequate health 
insurance but do not meet the hospital’s charity care guidelines. If such patients do not ultimately 
pay all or some portion of the bill for their care, the unpaid charges are written off as bad debt. 
However, because most hospitals have discretion to set their own charity care guidelines as they 
see fit, the distinction between charity care guidelines and bad debt is not well defined. As such, 
in comparison to tax-exempt hospitals, investor-owned hospitals may have more stringent 
criteria for patients seeking charity care and so have relatively lower charity care expenditures 
but ultimately face comparable costs for treating indigent patients due to relatively higher levels 
of bad debt (5, 14, 16, 18, 22, 28, 49, 53, 58, 60). 
Studies have also been conducted to assess the adequacy of tax-exempt hospitals’ 
community benefits compared to the value of the tax exemptions they receive. These studies 
have produced mixed results (17, 26, 39, 42, 55). While a few studies have found that greater tax 
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benefits are associated with more charitable spending, most studies have concluded that tax-
exempt hospitals’ community benefits fall short when compared to the absolute value of their 
exemptions. The conclusions that these studies have drawn regarding the adequacy of tax-
exempt hospitals’ community benefits, however, depend on how broadly community benefit was 
defined and how the value of a hospital’s tax exemption was estimated. 
 
Recent Policy and Legal Developments Regarding Tax-Exemption for Nonprofit Hospitals 
Expanded Reporting 
 Federal and state policy makers have generally responded to the previously noted 
controversy through regulatory actions and lawsuits aimed at increasing the accountability and 
oversight of tax-exempt hospitals with respect to their community benefit activities. At the 
federal level, one recent initiative is the expansion of reporting requirements contained in IRS 
Form 990. Form 990 is a tax form that all exempt organizations must submit (34). In 2007, the 
IRS created a related schedule for Form 990, Schedule H, to improve the transparency of the 
community benefits that tax-exempt hospitals provide (35). The IRS created Schedule H at least 
in part as a response to calls from numerous policy makers for greater transparency regarding the 
community benefit activities of tax-exempt hospitals (74).  Among those calling for greater 
transparency was Senator Charles Grassley, who, at the time, served as chairman of the Senate 
Finance Committee which held hearings in 2006 regarding community benefits provided by tax-
exempt hospitals (75).  
IRS Form 990-H requires that hospitals disclose their expenditures for two broad 
categories of community benefits (35). The first comes under the rubric of "Financial Assistance 
and Means-Tested Government Programs" and the second comes under the broad category of 
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"Other Benefits." Under the first category, tax-exempt hospitals are asked to report on financial 
assistance at cost, the unpaid costs of providing care to Medicaid, and the costs of other means-
tested government programs. Under the "Other Benefits” category tax-exempt hospitals are 
asked to report the unreimbursed costs of community health improvement services and 
community benefit operations, health professions education, subsidized health service, research, 
as well as any cash and in-kind contributions for community benefit.  
While, as noted, many states have community benefit reporting requirements for 
hospitals that cover many of these same categories, IRS Form 990 Schedule H establishes 
uniform reporting requirements for all tax-exempt hospitals in the US and thus constitutes an 
important new source of data for monitoring tax-exempt hospitals’ provision of community 
benefits. As of yet, the IRS has not made clear how it will use the Schedule H data, but it is 
possible that simply having to report such information may have an effect on tax-exempt 
hospitals' behavior.	  
	  
New Exemption Requirements	  
 Congress has established new requirements that nonprofit hospitals must follow to 
maintain their federal tax exemption. These requirements, now codified as I.R.C. Section 501(r), 
were included in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (hereafter referred to as the 
ACA), the comprehensive health reform law that was enacted in 2010. This law conditions 
hospitals’ eligibility for tax-exempt status on their ability to meet four basic requirements: (1) 
complete a community health needs assessment (CHNA) every three years and develop an 
implementation strategy to address identified needs; (2) establish and publicize a written 
financial assistance policy (FAP) and emergency medical care policy that meet certain statutory 
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requirements; (3) limit amounts charged for emergency and other medically necessary care 
provided to individuals eligible for assistance under the hospital’s financial assistance policy to 
no more than amounts generally billed to insured individuals; and (4) make reasonable efforts to 
determine whether an individual is eligible for the hospital’s financial assistance policy before 
engaging in extraordinary collection actions (46, 57). 
Among these new requirements, the requirement for hospitals to conduct a community 
health needs assessment is particularly relevant to the issue of whether and how tax-exempt 
hospitals are meeting their community benefit obligations. However, as of this writing, the IRS is 
still largely in the process of implementing 501(r) requirements through final regulations. It 
remains to be seen whether, and if so, how the IRS or state and local tax authorities will decide 
to use hospitals’ community health needs assessments in making determinations of their tax-
exempt status. However, this has not stopped community stakeholders from taking action. One 
recent example is the case of The National Health Law Program, which along with Florida Legal 
Services has filed an administrative complaint with the IRS against Jackson Health Systems of 
Miami-Dade County, Florida. The complaint alleges that the health system is not meeting its 
charity care obligations under the ACA. Jackson Health System is further accused of subjecting 
poor Miami-Dade residents to aggressive collection practices, despite the fact that they should 
have qualified for its financial assistance program (72). The emergence of administrative 
complains such as this one, brought pursuant to the ACA, may force hospitals to more critically 





 In addition to new exemption and reporting requirements at the federal level, state and 
local governments also have responded to controversies regarding tax exemption for nonprofit 
hospitals. Many states have established reporting requirements for tax-exempt hospitals that 
cover at least some of the information hospitals are now required to report in Form 990 Schedule 
H (45). Additionally, there have been several high profile lawsuits by municipalities that have 
challenged the property tax exemption of nonprofit hospitals on the ground of inadequate 
community benefit. While such litigation has not been widespread, certain prominent cases have 
emerged in recent years. These cases may be indicative of the kinds of issues that exist at the 
local level as hospitals and the communities they serve find themselves in the position where 
they have differing interpretations or understandings of what sort of community benefit should 
be provided by the hospitals. These divergent understandings of community benefit have 
emerged at a time when municipalities have been facing increasing costs for local services and 
funding of public employees’ pensions and retiree health benefits. Thus, cash-strapped 
municipalities now have additional incentives for viewing nonprofit hospitals, with their very 
valuable real estate holdings, as potential sources of revenue.  
 Three examples of community benefit litigation are particularly noteworthy. Two of these 
were litigated to completion several years ago. These include Utah County v. Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc. and Provena Covenant Medical Center v The Department of Revenue. A third 
and more recent case stems from the dispute between the University of Pittsburgh Medical 
Center and the City of Pittsburgh. 
 Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. presents significant issues regarding the 
justification for property tax exemption. Intermountain Health Care (IHC) is a nonprofit 
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corporation, which operates twenty-two hospitals in Utah and one in Idaho (66). When IHC 
applied for tax-exempt status, the Utah County Board of Equalization found that two of IHC’s 
hospitals were not eligible. The matter proceeded through several rounds of appeals, eventually 
reaching the state Supreme Court. The dispositive issue in IHC was a constitutional one, namely 
whether the Utah statutes governing tax exemption impermissibly expanded the constitutionally 
defined meaning of “charitable purposes” when it made the sweeping generalization that all 
hospitals acted for charitable purposes (65). The Utah Supreme Court held that charity requires 
the existence of a gift to the community, not just community benefit (66). In its ruling, the Court 
highlighted the fact that, though IHC had a policy of treating everyone regardless of ability to 
pay, due to the overall paucity of charity care, along with efforts to keep charity care levels as 
low as possible IHC's provision of charity care was inadequate.(66) The Court explicitly 
excluded discounted care as charity care, quoting an earlier case: “Where material reciprocity 
between alleged recipients and their alleged donor exists--then charity does not.”(66) The court 
found that IHC was not in any substantive way different from an investor-owned  hospital.(66)  
The court also struck down the statute at issue as an unconstitutional expansion of the narrow 
exemption in the Utah Constitution.(66) 
 Provena Covenant Medical Center v The Department of Revenue (2010) has been a 
watershed case for community benefit law (44). In Provena, litigation ensued between a 
nonprofit healthcare provider and the State of Illinois, following a determination by the 
Champaign County Board of Review that the health system’s provision of community benefits 
was insufficient. The Illinois Supreme Court held that there is indeed a minimum threshold for 
benefit to the community, though it did not go so far as to state what that minimum is. In its 
ruling the court castigated Provena for the inadequacy of its charitable activity. The Provena case 
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has reshaped the legal landscape for tax-exempt health-care providers in Illinois. It has spurred 
greater regulatory scrutiny of healthcare providers, and given hospitals reason to scrutinize 
carefully the adequacy of their own community benefit practices.   
 One recent case involved a dispute between the City of Pittsburgh and the University of 
Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) (4). In recent state litigation, the City of Pittsburgh 
demanded both the withdrawal of the medical center's tax exempt status and the payment of back 
taxes. The litigation focused on the meager nature of UPMC's community benefit provisions as 
well as the disproportionate compensation of its executives. The latter, it is alleged, is an 
indication that the institution is not being run as a charity. UPMC responded by filing its own 
law suit in federal court alleging violation of its civil rights by the City of Pittsburgh. Following 
the counter-suit, both parties entered into negotiations and eventually both cases were dropped. 
(76)  This example is nonetheless indicative of the kinds of controversies which may emerge as 
cash-strapped municipalities turn increasingly to large nonprofit hospitals as potential sources of 
revenue. 
 
Future Policy Directions for Community Benefit and Tax-Exempt Hospitals 
 Since 1969, when the IRS adopted the community benefit standard, much has changed in 
the US healthcare system generally and for nonprofit hospitals specifically. No longer 
almshouses for the poor, nonprofit hospitals today are typically large corporate entities with 
complex business operations and financial structures. As such, they compete with a substantial 
investor-owned health care sector that includes hospitals, freestanding ambulatory surgical 
centers, and diagnostic imaging centers (29). Moreover, nonprofit hospitals are facing growing 
pressures from public and private payers to redefine their role in the US healthcare system. 
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Among these pressures is the expectation that hospitals take broader responsibility for the health 
of the populations they serve (54). Hospitals are encouraged, for instance, to form or join 
accountable care organizations (ACOs), which offer participating providers financial incentives 
to meet spending and quality targets by managing the health status of a defined population (43).  
Together, these developments have raised new issues and concerns regarding the 
adequacy of the community benefits that nonprofit hospitals provide in return for tax exemption. 
Indeed, while controversy over the community benefits of tax-exempt hospitals is long standing, 
it appears to have reached new heights in recent years. This is evinced by the governmental 
hearings and media attention devoted to the topic and the percolation of litigation at the local 
level over the property tax exemption of nonprofit hospitals (24). As such, this may be an 
opportune time to reevaluate current tax-exemption standards and seriously discuss new policies 
for tax-exemption as applied to nonprofit hospitals. In the remainder of this article, we outline 
three areas for reform that would help ensure that the community benefits provided by tax-
exempt hospitals meet the needs of their communities: (1) increasing transparency regarding 
nonprofit hospitals’ provision of community benefits via wider public availability of data, (2) 
fostering accountability by establishing standards for what community benefits may justify 
healthcare providers’ tax-exempt status, and (3) improving population health by encouraging 
hospitals to attend to the broader health needs of the communities they serve.  
The first potential area for reform concerns increasing transparency. As a result of 
advances in information technology, detailed data on the state of health and health care in the US 
is increasingly becoming publicly available. Greater availability of information, however, does 
not always translate into improved transparency. In the case of tax-exempt hospitals’ community 
benefit reporting on Form 990 Schedule H, for instance, detailed information on hospital 
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expenditures is available, yet the information itself is not readily accessible to individuals and 
groups that may have an interest in the activities of tax-exempt hospitals. As noted, the IRS has 
not articulated a plan for how it will utilize data from Form 990 Schedule H. Nor has it taken 
steps to make the information readily available to communities. At present, the public can only 
access Schedule H information by obtaining the reports directly from hospitals or through data 
vendors, such as GuideStar, both of which can be time consuming and costly. Similarly, among 
states that require tax-exempt hospitals to report on their community benefit activities, there is 
variation as to the public accessibility of the reported information. Some states, such as 
California and Maryland, foster transparency by making all data publicly available online (9, 38). 
Given the availability of information regarding hospitals’ community benefit activities, 
federal and state agencies should consider taking steps to compile these data and make the 
information available to the public in an easily accessible online database, ideally free of charge. 
Such a database would greatly increase transparency and as a result inform civic dialogue 
regarding the role that nonprofit hospitals do and should play in their communities. Increased 
transparency also would ensure continued scrutiny of the adequacy of tax-exempt hospitals’ 
community benefit activities. As an example, one can look to the significant advances that have 
been made in the transparency of performance data for health care providers, particularly quality 
of care. Today, community groups and individual consumers can access websites that offer a 
wide range of information pertaining to the quality of care furnished by hospitals, physicians, 
and types of healthcare providers (21). While providers frequently have concerns about the 
validity of the performance measures posted on such websites, increased transparency has itself 
spurred more effort in developing better performance measures (73).  
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A second potential area for reform concerns increasing accountability through the 
development of clear expectations for tax exemption for nonprofit hospitals. The federal and 
most local tax exemption standards generally lack explicit criteria regarding what is expected of 
tax-exempt hospitals in terms of their organizational structure and activities. In the absence of 
clear expectations, communities will continue to question whether the community benefits that 
tax-exempt hospitals provide are adequate when compared to the value of their federal, state, and 
local tax exemptions. At the same time, tax-exempt hospitals will continue to be vulnerable to 
government inquiries, lawsuits, and media scrutiny regarding their community benefit activities. 
Increasing accountability may involve developing clear, well-defined expectations for 
tax-exempt hospitals. One approach might be for the IRS to adopt quantitative standards for the 
amount and composition of hospitals’ community benefit expenditures required in exchange for 
tax exemption. The benefit of such an approach is that federal-level quantitative standards would 
be fairly unambiguous and thus relatively easy to apply to determine tax exemption. Several 
states, including Pennsylvania, Utah, and Texas, have adopted explicit quantitative standards that 
nonprofit hospitals must meet or exceed to remain tax-exempt at the local level (11, 27). 
However, explicit quantitative standards represent a “one size fits all” approach that may not 
result in the optimal level and types of benefit for an individual community. Health needs differ 
across communities and some variation in the composition of community benefits provided by 
nonprofit hospitals is thus desirable. Federal standards bear the risk that hospitals may focus their 
efforts on the activities that “count” for the purpose of tax exemption rather than the ones that are 
most needed. Moreover, explicit quantitative standards can result in a “race to the bottom” when 
hospitals that have historically provided high levels of community benefits reduce their efforts to 
the level required for tax exemption. In Texas, for instance, where there are explicit standards for 
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how much community benefit is required of nonprofit hospitals to remain tax-exempt at the local 
level, hospitals with spending levels above the threshold level have been found to lower their 
community benefit spending (37). 
Alternatively, an approach to increase accountability might be to avoid establishing 
explicit quantitative criteria at the federal level and instead encourage states or even communities 
to define the expectations for tax-exempt hospitals. This would avoid the problems of a “one size 
fits all” approach discussed above. State or local level policymakers could define standards based 
on the unique health needs of their populations. The community health needs assessments that 
tax-exempt hospitals are required to conduct every three years for the purpose of federal tax 
exemption might provide useful information to policymakers on the most pressing health needs 
of a community. Specific needs identified in hospitals’ CHNAs might be helpful to develop and 
continuously update state or local-level standards to ensure that the community benefits hospitals 
provide meet the most pressing needs of their communities. 
Of course, state or local-level standards may still result in a “race to the bottom.”  To 
avoid this situation, it might be possible to define standards not in terms of financial resources 
spent by a hospital on community benefits but in terms of the outcomes achieved as a result of a 
hospital’s community benefit activities (47). This would entail evaluating the consequences and 
the health benefits ensuing from hospitals’ community benefit activities to determine their 
adequacy rather than focusing merely on their dollar amounts spent. Moving away from an 
input-oriented approach toward a more outcome-oriented evaluation of hospitals’ community 
benefits, however, represents a major paradigm shift. Improved availability and accessibility of 
data at the community level, for instance, in the form of the County Health Rankings (15), may 
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enable such a shift, yet at this point no state or local entity has made tax exemption partially or 
fully conditional on the achievement of predefined health outcomes.  
 Focusing on outcomes rather than inputs also would be a first step toward achieving our 
third area of reform, ensuring that the community benefits that tax-exempt hospitals provide 
contribute to meaningful improvements in population health. This area of reform is closely 
linked to broader changes in how health care in the US is organized and financed. There is 
growing recognition that the prevailing medical model of focusing on treatment and cure at the 
expense of prevention and health promotion is ineffective and unsustainable. Broad efforts to 
reform the US health system thus include calls for increased attention to population health (7). 
While hospitals have historically focused on providing inpatient care to acutely ill patients, they 
are now facing growing pressures to move beyond caring for individual patients to take broader 
responsibility for the health of the population they serve (54). This paradigm shift has become 
evident in new reimbursement initiatives launched by both public and private payers. The 
Medicare Shared Savings Program, for instance, offers providers  involved in an accountable 
care organization (ACO) financial incentives to manage the health of a defined population of 
Medicare beneficiaries in- and outside of the hospital (10). Medicaid and private payers have 
established similar reimbursement arrangements whereby participating providers are paid – at 
least in part – for keeping patients healthy and out of the hospital.  
 Hospitals’ community benefit activities have the potential to play an important role in the 
country’s efforts to improve population health. First, in their CHNAs, all tax-exempt hospitals 
should now be regularly identifying the most pressing health needs of their communities. This is 
an important starting point. In addition, as part of their CHNAs, hospitals are required to develop 
an implementation strategy to meet the community health needs identified through the CHNA. 
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These strategies will ideally contribute to meaningful improvements in the health of the 
communities served. Second, as the ACA takes effect and the number of uninsured Americans 
declines the demand for hospital-based charity care should also decline. While the magnitude of 
these changes is not yet foreseeable, hospitals may be able to use any savings achieved to invest 
in community activities that benefit the health of their communities more broadly. Third and 
lastly, targeting community benefit activities to address the most critical needs of the community 
will not only help a hospital fulfill federal, state, and local expectations for tax exemption but 
also support their efforts to keep patients healthy. While in the past, keeping patients healthy and 
out of the hospital has been bad for business, in this new era, improving population health 




We appear to be entering a new era regarding the nexus between tax-exemption for nonprofit 
hospitals and community benefits. As noted, the last major change to the federal tax-exemption 
standard occurred in 1969. Since then, a great deal has changed in terms of the delivery of 
healthcare and its funding, as well as the expectations which society has regarding how health is 
to be maintained and improved. Likewise, a significant expansion has occurred in the 
information that is now available to policymakers and the public for reviewing the community 
benefit activities of tax-exempt hospitals. Yet, the long-standing controversy over whether tax-
exempt hospitals meet their community benefit obligations has only become more intense in 
recent years. This controversy will likely continue as long as federal and most local exemption 
standards lack clearly defined expectations for nonprofit hospitals. Therefore, an examination of 
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current tax-exemption standards for nonprofit hospitals relative to the promotion of community 
benefits is timely.  
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Evaluating Hospitals’ Provision of Community Benefit: An Argument for an Outcome-
Based Approach to Nonprofit Hospital Tax Exemption 
 
Abstract 
Nonprofit hospitals are exempt from federal income taxation if they pass organizational 
and operational tests, including satisfying the community-benefit standard. Policymakers, 
however, have questioned the adequacy of the community benefits that nonprofit hospitals 
provide in exchange for these exemptions. 
The Internal Revenue Service recently responded to these concerns by redesigning its tax 
forms for nonprofit hospitals. The new Form 990 Schedule H requires nonprofit hospitals to 
provide additional information about their community-benefit activities. This new reporting 
requirement, however, places an undue focus on input-based community-benefit indicators, in 
particular expenditures. 
We argue that expanding the current input-based reporting requirement to include not only 
monetary inputs but also population health outcomes would achieve greater benefit for society. 
 
Introduction 
Nonprofit hospitals are vital to the health and welfare of millions of Americans (1) and 
constitute a major portion of our economy (2). The tax exemption that these institutions received 
was worth $12.6 billion in 2002 and has subsequently grown (3). To remain tax-exempt,
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nonprofit hospitals have to meet the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS’s) community-benefit 
standard, which grants health care organizations tax exemptions in exchange for engaging in 
activities that promote health for the benefit of the community (4).  
Policymakers have recently started to question the adequacy of the community-benefit 
activities that nonprofit hospitals provide in exchange for their substantial tax exemptions. The 
IRS responded to these concerns by redesigning its federal tax return for nonprofit hospitals, 
Form 990, and adding Schedule H (5). However, this new reporting requirement only partially 
achieves its policy objective because it is hampered by an undue focus on input-based indicators 
of community benefit, in particular how much nonprofit hospitals spend on community-benefit 
activities. The current standard does not assess the health outcomes that these community-benefit 
activities do or do not help to achieve. The community-benefit standard would provide a more 
meaningful evaluation of hospitals’ community-benefit activities if it complemented input-based 
measures of community benefit with information on population health outcomes, thereby better 
effectuating the standard’s original policy goals and achieving greater benefit for society (6).  
A standard that includes input as well as outcome measures would offer significant 
incentives for nonprofit hospitals to increase public benefit. A new community-benefit standard 
should thus take a more balanced approach, evaluating both input and outcome-related measures, 
which show how benefit accrues to the public. A more robust conception of community benefit, 
with tighter criteria for inclusion and exclusion of potential population benefits, would help 
facilitate this transition. 
Provisions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) have modified the 
community-benefit standard to include measures of both input and outcomes. As of this year, 
nonprofit hospitals are required to conduct regular community-health needs assessments and 
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implement improvement plans, which may provide some of the information necessary for a 
meaningful evaluation of the outcomes of a hospital’s community-benefit initiatives (7).  
Policymakers at both the federal and state level have many tools at their disposal to help 
make the community-benefit standard more outcome-focused. The IRS, for instance, could 
require nonprofit hospitals to complement their community-benefit expenditures disclosed in 
Form 990 Schedule H with a detailed report on the population health outcomes of their 
community-benefit activities. Federal and state governments could then use this information 
when deciding whether to grant nonprofit hospitals tax exemptions. 
 
Overview of Nonprofit Hospital Tax Exemption 
Federal policy supports charitable organizations through tax exemptions as a way of 
furthering policy goals. These tax exemptions are codified in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code (8). Historically, the goal of this policy has been to give nonprofit hospitals 
incentives to provide additional benefits to their communities beyond providing health care 
service in exchange for reimbursement. 
Originally, for an entity to be tax-exempt, it either had to fit into one of the enumerated 
categories contained in Section 501(c)(3) (educational, religious, etc.) or else be charitable (9). 
Charitable had 2 meanings: either broad-based public benefit or alleviation of poverty (9). When 
hospitals were in the business of providing free care to the poor, they fit neatly into the 
alleviation of poverty category. In 1956, the IRS codified this qualification in the financial-
ability standard, which required hospitals (to the extent financially possible) to provide health 
care to those who would otherwise be unable to afford it (10).  
Because of changes in both the practice of medicine and the financing of health care, 
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hospitals evolved out of the parameters of the exemption they had once received. In its 1969 
Revenue Ruling, the IRS introduced a new standard for tax exemption, the community-benefit 
standard, which grants health care organizations tax exemptions in exchange for engaging in 
activities that promote health for the benefit of the community (4). To be granted tax exemptions, 
nonprofit hospitals generally have to meet all of the following criteria: 
1. operate an emergency department that cares for anyone, regardless of ability to pay; 
2. provide nonemergency department care for anyone who can pay; 
3. participate in Medicare and Medicaid; 
4. create a governing board that represents the community; 
5. allow any qualified professional who applies to receive medical-staff privileges; and 
6. reinvest surplus funds, rather than disseminate them as dividends (11).  
 
In 1983, the IRS determined that hospitals without emergency departments could be 
considered tax-exempt if all other factors were satisfied (12). Moreover, not all of the factors 
have to be satisfied in every circumstance because the IRS can make determinations on a case-
by-case basis (12). Despite the broad scope of the community-benefit standard, many nonprofit 
hospital leaders still consider community benefit to be largely synonymous with charity care 
despite the fact that they are no longer required to provide such care to qualify for tax 
exemptions (13).  
In addition to federal income tax exemptions, states and localities frequently grant 
nonprofit hospitals exemptions from state income and local property taxes. Although in principle 
federal and state tax systems are separate, a number of states and localities automatically grant 
tax exemptions to hospitals that have been awarded 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status by the IRS (14).  
Policymakers at the federal, state, and local levels are concerned that the current 
standards used to determine whether nonprofit hospitals receive tax-exempt status do not achieve 
their full policy objective of promoting health for the benefit of the community. As any tax 
exemption shifts the tax burden from the tax-exempt entity to the rest of the tax-paying 
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community (15), there must be a compelling justification for any tax exemption (16). Sen 
Charles Grassley (R, Iowa) stressed this point during a hearing in 2006 on nonprofit tax 
exemptions (16). Moreover, once the ACA takes full effect, a substantial number of currently 
uninsured people are expected to gain health insurance coverage (17), which will reduce the need 
for charity care in many communities. Nonprofit hospitals in these communities will thus be 
required to seek alternative avenues for providing community benefit if they wish to remain tax-
exempt. 
 
Undue Focus on Monetary Inputs 
In 2008, the IRS revised its Form 990 and added Schedule H, which henceforth requires 
hospitals to disclose their community-benefit activities in detail (18). This new reporting 
requirement is intended to enable the IRS to better assess hospitals’ compliance with the 
community-benefit standard (12).  
In Schedule H, nonprofit hospitals are required to report on the care provided to charity 
patients and patients covered under means-tested government programs such as Medicaid and the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program. In addition, hospitals are asked to report on select other 
community-benefit activities, including subsidized health services, community health 
improvement services, medical research, and health professions education (18). At a minimum, 
nonprofit hospitals are required to disclose their net community-benefit expenditures, which is 
their total expenditures minus any direct offsetting revenues (19). Furthermore, hospitals may 
choose to provide additional information such as the number of activities they engaged in during 
the reporting period and the number of people served through their community-benefit programs 
(19). The fact that the IRS now asks for an account of a broad range of community-benefit 
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activities signifies some recognition of the notion that the term community benefit not only 
includes charity care but also encompasses other services aimed at improving the health and 
well-being of the community at large. 
Form 990 Schedule H, as it exists currently, focuses on inputs to assess the adequacy of a 
hospital’s community-benefit activities. Inputs, both monetary and nonmonetary, play a crucial 
role in improving community health. In addition, from the perspective of the IRS, inputs are easy 
to measure and, more importantly, do not require risk adjustment and are thus less susceptible to 
gaming (19). However, committing additional resources to community-benefit activities does not 
always result in better population-health outcomes. We therefore argue that the community-
benefit standard should be expanded to include not only input-based but also outcome-related 
measures. A combination of input and outcome metrics would allow policymakers to better 
evaluate whether a hospital’s community-benefit activities are actually generating benefits for 
the community. For example, a nonprofit hospital may report that it spent $50  000 on workforce 
development. This number and the accompanying financial data, however, indicate nothing 
about whether the program created any real benefit. Based on the expenditure information 
reported in Schedule H alone, there is no way to accurately identify how many individuals were 
trained, what they were trained in, and whether they were successfully placed in jobs. 
Rather than evaluating community benefit solely in terms of dollars spent, a modified 
approach based on both input and outcome measures would require hospitals to design 
community-benefit programs that make a measurable difference in the health of their respective 
communities. Such an approach would assess hospitals’ achievements by measuring both dollars 
spent on the set of community-benefit activities defined in Form 990 Schedule H and 
improvements in a number of health-outcome indicators tied to the specific community-benefit 
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activity. Reforms of this type are already under way at the state level. Maryland, for instance, 
passed legislation in 2012 that requires hospitals to describe their efforts to track and reduce 
health disparities within their communities as part of their community-benefit reports (20).  
 
Challenges of an Outcome-Based Approach 
Complementing the current input-based approach to nonprofit-hospital tax exemption by 
also assessing hospitals’ performance on a number of health outcomes brings with it certain 
challenges, among them the problems of 1. How population-health outcomes can be measured, 
and 2. How these outcomes can be attributed to individual hospitals and their community-benefit 
initiatives. 
With respect to the first challenge, measuring health outcomes is the routine work of 
epidemiologists. Scholars have already provided compelling examples of ways to mount 
community-based interventions (21) and have shown measurable differences in health outcomes 
between different health systems (22). Moreover, many hospitals across the country have 
engaged in targeted interventions to fulfill particular health needs in their communities with very 
positive results (23). In addition, efforts are under way at the national level to develop 
population-health measures that will allow hospitals to assess their contributions to the 
community. The National Quality Forum, for instance, has endorsed a set of standardized, 
scientifically evaluated indicators that hospitals can use to assess population-health performance 
(24). Likewise, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality has developed a number of 
indicators, such as the measures of preventable admissions included in its Prevention Quality 
Indicators, which could be utilized to evaluate the efforts of hospitals at improving population 
health (25).  
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Attributing population-health outcomes to individual hospitals and their community-
benefit initiatives remains a more difficult challenge. Given that many factors influence 
population health and do so in complex ways, no single entity can be held accountable for health 
outcomes. In particular, in large urban settings with multiple nonprofit hospitals, members of the 
communities surrounding any 1 hospital may not necessarily seek services at that particular 
hospital, so the correlation between the health status of the surrounding communities and a 
hospital’s community-benefit programs may be weak or even nonexistent. Hospital managers are 
thus understandably apprehensive about any discussion that suggests using health-outcome 
measures to complement the current input-based approach for the purpose of maintaining tax-
exempt status. 
Despite the inherent difficulties, attributing outcomes to specific community-benefit 
interventions is possible in well-defined circumstances (26). For instance, a study conducted via 
a series of large-scale trials in Elmira, New York; Memphis, Tennessee; and Denver, Colorado, 
found that when nurses educated new parents from disadvantaged populations about proper 
infant care, the health of both mother and child improved on several dimensions, including better 
perinatal health, lower rates of abuse and neglect, and reduced reliance on public-assistance 
programs (27). A second example comes from the 1990s, when the New York State Department 
of Health and Mt. Sinai Hospital worked together to combat tuberculosis. Together, the hospital 
and the department created “TB directly observed treatment” to help those afflicted with 
tuberculosis to properly care for themselves. Many of those afflicted were homeless or HIV 
positive, and presented special treatment difficulties. All those who began the program either 
completed it or were finishing at the time of the study. The study found that the program greatly 
improved the health of the indigent population of New York (28).  
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Besides having programs that focus on improving health outcomes of certain subgroups 
of patients, nonprofit hospitals have also begun to engage in activities calibrated to improve the 
health of the population at large. For instance, St. Joseph Mercy Hospital in Ypsilanti, Michigan, 
has established a weekly farmer’s market in the hospital lobby to provide fresh fruits and 
vegetables to a population of patients whose access to fresh produce may be limited (29, 30). In 
addition to local initiatives, nonprofit hospitals are also participating in broader efforts to 
improve health outcomes. For example, Vermont has been working steadily to reform its health 
care system by turning it into a “pay-for-population health system” (31). Vermont’s efforts rely 
on the convergence of several different factors, which include implementing and strengthening 
Patient Centered Medical Homes and Accountable Care Organizations. The successful 
development of both of these concepts depends in large part on the participation of hospitals. 
Another example is Community Care of North Carolina (CCNC), which is a program that has 
been spearheaded by primary care physicians who aim to improve quality, utilization, and cost 
objectives among North Carolina’s Medicaid population (32). The CCNC works to link all of its 
patients to medical homes and has forged partnerships with hospitals that help the CCNC 
connect to communities and provide essential resources. 
Alternatively, if the community-benefit activities a hospital engages in are evidence-
based and contribute to measurable improvements in health behavior or community 
environments, then it may be unnecessary to require proof of a causal connection between a 
specific community-benefit initiative and improved population-health outcomes. In such cases, 
documentation of the specific community-benefit activities as well as evidence of their 
effectiveness should be considered sufficient for the purpose of tax exemption. However, given 
that each hospital’s community-benefit program is unique, the IRS should—as it has always 
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done—use discretion in assessing the adequacy of a hospital’s community-benefit activities 
given the complexities of existing programs. 
 
First Step toward an Outcome-Based Approach 
In addition to recent amendments to federal nonprofit hospital reporting standards, the 
ACA established a number of new requirements that nonprofit hospitals must comply with in 
order to remain tax-exempt (33). Most importantly, the ACA’s “Additional Requirements for 
Charitable Hospitals” mandate (§9007 ACA) requires that, starting in 2012, nonprofit hospitals 
conduct a community-health needs assessment (CHNA) at least once every 3 years. A CHNA is 
a written document that describes the community served by the hospital and identifies the health 
needs of the community. As part of their CHNA, hospitals are asked to develop and implement 
an improvement strategy to address unmet needs identified through the CHNA. In their 
implementation plans, hospitals are asked both to identify specific activities to be conducted to 
improve community health and to develop a set of valid and actionable performance measures to 
ensure accountability. 
The requirement that nonprofit hospitals conduct regular CHNAs and implement 
community-health improvement plans will compel such institutions to evaluate community-
health needs and the impact of their community-benefit activities on the health of the 
communities they serve. Evaluating changes in population health outcomes from one 
community-health needs assessment to the next could provide some of the information needed 
for an outcome-based assessment of hospitals’ community-benefit activities and thus be a first 
step toward a modified approach to nonprofit hospital tax exemption. In this way, the new 




To implement this new approach, the Federal Government, via the IRS, could integrate 
population-health outcome measures into its current process for determining nonprofit hospital 
tax exemptions under section 501(c)(3) of the tax code. Specifically, the IRS could assess 
hospitals’ contribution to the health of their communities by noting the improvements in the 
population-health performance measures that hospitals specified in their implementation plans. 
Similarly, depending on their particular legal framework, state governments could integrate 
outcome-based measurements into their tax exemption determinations either administratively via 
a state revenue agency or legislatively through either new state or local laws. State tax assessors 
could thereby promulgate new standards for exemptions from state income and local property 
taxes. 
Developing effective community-benefit programs that are responsive to the health needs 
of the community and aimed at improving community-health outcomes will become increasingly 
important for hospitals in the future. Beyond the additional community-benefit requirements 
mandated by the ACA, the new health reform law mandates significant changes to the way 
health care will be delivered and paid for. In particular, the move toward bundled or even 
population-based provider-reimbursement systems, as exemplified in the rules and regulations 
governing Patient Centered Medical Homes and Accountable Care Organizations (34), will 
provide additional incentives for hospitals to establish community-benefit programs that promote 
health in the community and reduce the need for and use of expensive hospital services, for 
which hospitals may no longer be reimbursed separately. Adopting an outcome-based 
population-health approach to community-benefit planning will thus serve hospitals well in the 
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An Outcome-Based Approach to Nonprofit Hospital Tax Exemption 
	  
Introduction 
In 2000, the Wexford Medical Group, a small clinic in Cadillac, MI, provided charity 
care to only two patients. In 2001, that number had increased to eleven, bringing the combined 
charity care amount for both years to only $2,400. This was despite an annual patient volume of 
40,000 to 44,000 and a yearly budget of $10 million (1). Despite the fact that the provision of 
charity care in this case was nearly non-existent, the Michigan Supreme Court found that 
Wexford had passed the test for sufficient community benefit (2). The Court failed to articulate a 
compelling principle for how to measure whether the non-profit did enough to benefit the 
community and thus could be considered deserving of a tax exemption. This case is indicative of 
a broader phenomenon. It illustrates how the jurisprudence on the community benefit standard 
has betrayed the policy objectives behind the exemptions of non-profit health systems. The 
confusion of legal standards, combined with an ossified focus on institutional structure, has 
obscured the original purpose of this tax exemption, which was to foster activities that benefit the 
public by promoting health.  
Nonprofit healthcare systems are both vital to the health and welfare of millions of 
Americans (3) and constitute a major portion of our economy (4). The tax exemption that these 
institutions enjoy was worth $12.6 billion in 2002, and has grown since (5). The community 
benefit standard is the test for federal tax exemption for nonprofit hospitals in the United States 
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(6). In 1969, the IRS established that for a nonprofit healthcare provider to be charitable it need 
not give out charity care (7), rather “[t]he ruling defined the charity provided by nonprofit 
hospitals to be the provision of benefits to the community as a whole...” (8). The reasoning 
expressed in the revenue rulings was as follows: To qualify for a federal exemption a nonprofit 
hospital must be “organized and operated exclusively for some purpose considered 
‘charitable’…the promotion of health is considered to be a charitable purpose [therefore] a 
nonprofit organization whose purpose and activity are providing hospital care is promoting 
health and may, therefore, qualify as organized and operated in furtherance of a charitable 
purpose.” This portion of the test has since been superseded. Notably, the IRS now also 
considers research and educational activities in its community benefit determinations. While, 
formally, community benefit could encompass a broad scope of factors, in practice 
uncompensated care constitutes the sine qua non of the current community benefit test (9).  
There is mounting evidence that, as currently applied, this federal standard and the state 
and local standards modeled on it are problematic and do not achieve their express policy goal of 
providing an appropriate contribution from nonprofit entities to the public good. One reason this 
policy fails to achieve its goal is because of an undue focus on input-based indicia of community 
benefit and insufficient attention paid to the health outcomes that these institutions' community-
benefit activities achieve. 	  
There are a variety of ways in which the tax exempt status on nonprofit hospitals could be 
justified. Yet the model the IRS has settled on, community benefit, is undermined by both 
conceptual weaknesses and practical constraints. It has, nonetheless, proved to be politically and 
institutionally durable. Therefore, the most compelling avenue for reform is to provide more 
rigorous and meaningful metrics for measuring the sufficiency of the community benefits that 
45 
 
nonprofit hospitals must provide. This manuscript thus argues that greater attention to individual 
and population health outcomes will provide a more meaningful evaluation, better effectuating 
the policy goals of this standard, achieving greater benefit for society, and instituting a standard 
more consistent with the theoretical justification for tax exemption. 	  
This manuscript puts forward the thesis that courts and tax administrators should enforce 
the community benefit standard in a way that focuses on outcome-related measures that show 
that benefit inures to the public. A population health approach to community benefit would 
provide such an outcome-oriented approach. As articulated in Rubin, et al. such a standard could 
provide a more rational basis for evaluating community benefit: 	  
Rather than evaluating community benefit solely in terms of dollars spent, a 
modified approach based on both input and outcome measures would require 
hospitals to design community-benefit programs that make a measurable 
difference in the health of their respective communities. Such an approach 
would assess hospitals’ achievements by measuring both dollars spent on the set 
of community-benefit activities defined in Form 990 Schedule H and 
improvements in a number of health-outcome indicators tied to the specific 
community-benefit activity (10).	  
	  
A more robust conception of benefit, with tighter criteria for inclusion and exclusion of potential 
population benefits, will help facilitate this transition. Moreover, there is mounting evidence that 
both changes brought about by the Affordable Car Act, as well as broader trends in the 
healthcare industry will lead to population health being the dominant force in healthcare delivery 
over the coming decades. 	  
Part I of this manuscript explains the justification for the nonprofit exemption policy and 
the ways in which the current standards fail to realize the goals of that policy. Part II puts 
forward a new way of formulating that standard, considers several alternatives, and then explains 




Part I: The Current Legal Standards For Tax-Exemption of Nonprofit Hospitals 
Part I of this manuscript argues that the current standards for nonprofit hospital tax-
exemption are faulty. The current standards in use for tax exemption for nonprofit hospitals have 
led to divergent rulings in recent litigation, do not accord with the best normative justification for 
such a policy, and do not produce optimal outcomes. Part I.A uses illustrative cases to 
demonstrate that trends in current case law lead to two increasingly divergent approaches. Part 
I.B explores the justifications for nonprofit tax exemption, and argues that the “subsidy” 
justification is the only one applicable to nonprofit hospitals. Part I.C describes the history and 
development of the federal community benefit standard. Part I.D summarizes the empirical 
evidence of the effects of the current standard, and shows that the current incentives are, to some 
degree, perverse.  
 
Section I.A Historical Analysis: Development of the Community Benefit Standard	  
Current standards for tax exemption of nonprofit hospitals are grounded in the common 
law doctrine of charity (11). The concept of public benefit is integral to this doctrine of charity 
(12). The inurement of benefit to the public is the essential feature justifying the special status of 
the charitable enterprise. In the case of nonprofit health care providers, the lack of forethought in 
administrative determinations, path dependence, and rapid change in the provision of health care 
have created perverse incentives for health providers. These incentives explain the dissatisfaction 
that many have expressed with the current community benefit standard.  
Federal policy supports charitable organizations through tax exemptions as a way of 
furthering community goals. The Internal Revenue Service has codified this support in United 
States Code title 26, Section 501, subsection (c), which defines what manner of charitable 
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organizations qualifies for tax-exemption (13). The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that 
these tax exemptions for nonprofit hospitals totaled $12.6 billion in 2002 (14).	  
The current legal regime governing tax-exempt medical providers is the result of a 
century of ad hoc changes and path-dependence (15). Originally, for an entity to be tax exempt it 
either had to fit into one of the enumerated categories (educational, religious, etc.) or else be 
charitable, which had two meanings (16). One was broad-based public benefit, and the other was 
the alleviation of poverty (17). When hospitals were in the business of giving care to the poor for 
free, they fit rather neatly into the alleviation of poverty category. In 1956, the IRS codified this 
qualification with the financial-ability standard, which required hospitals to provide (to the 
extent financially possible) health care to those unable to afford it otherwise (18).	  
Because of changes in the practice of medicine and changes in the public and private 
finance of medical care, hospitals evolved out of the exemption they had once enjoyed. 
Contemporary observers thought that the creation of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 would 
obviate the financial-ability standard (19). In 1969, the IRS introduced a new tax standard, the 
community benefit standard (20), and with it a new raison d'être for nonprofit health providers. 
This ruling, in some ways, was insightful, as it recognized that the improvement of the health of 
the public could constitute charitable activity. The problem is that the standard that the IRS 
instituted had a maladroit test that was not a good metric for whether an institution provided 
benefit to the public, because it looks at institutional form rather than achievement of community 
benefit. This test, still in use as of this writing, requires hospitals to do the following:	  
Formally, the test for exemption is as follows:	  
1) Operate an emergency room that cares for anyone, regardless of ability to pay;	  
2) Provide non-emergency room care for anyone who can pay; 
3) Participate in Medicare and Medicaid; 
4) Create a governing board that represents the community; 
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5) Allow any professional who is qualified and applies to have medical-staff privileges; 
6) Re-invest surplus funds, rather than disseminate them as dividends (21). 
 
Notably, in 1983 the IRS modified this standard. It determined that hospitals without emergency 
rooms could still be eligible for exemption. It also determined that not all of the above-
mentioned factors must be satisfied in all circumstances (22). While there have been some minor 
formal changes since the 1969 ruling, in practice the standard has narrowed considerably with 
uncompensated care constituting in the minds of many, if not the dispositive criterion for 
exemption, then at least the he sine qua non of the current community benefit test. While 
education and research are also of considerable importance, charity care is now regarded by 
many as the central defining feature for nonprofit status.  
 As currently constituted, the community benefit standard does not take into account the 
consequences of these requirements or any of the benefits they may or may not yield to the 
community. The first three criteria focus on allowing individuals access to health care, 
particularly emergency room care. The focuses of the fifth and sixth criteria on medical staff and 
on revenues, respectively, do not require that any benefit be created for the public at-large. Many 
have argued that the fifth and sixth criteria help the hospital better aid the community, but they 
do not, in and of themselves, constitute such a benefit. A similar critique can be mounted against 
the fourth criterion, which does not require that care and benefits flow to the community the 
board is drawn from (23). 	  
As the community benefit standard was designed to be a counterpoint to the original 
“financial need standard,” and the PPACA specifically mentions assessing what the “community 
needs,” it is apparent that it must be more than merely helping discrete individuals in need (24). 
To meaningfully constitute a community benefit, there must be a measurable increase in the 
social welfare of the community. If not, then merely redirecting other funding sources to assist 
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those unable to afford healthcare (the old “financial ability” standard) would still be sufficient. 
Instead, nonprofits are being asked to provide some service that “lessens the burden of 
government” in exchange for the subsidies they receive (25).	  
In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which has 
added additional requirements for nonprofit status. Consistent with the traditional idea of a 
hospital as a place to help those who cannot afford medical care, the new rules mandate that tax-
exempt hospitals cannot charge those who qualify for charity care more than the lowest amount 
charged for the same procedure to those with health insurance (26). Nonprofit hospitals now 
must have an explicit financial assistance policy that is publicized throughout the community 
(27). Moreover, the hospital may not send a patient to collections before it has ascertained 
whether that patient was eligible for financial assistance (28). Under the new law, nonprofit 
hospitals must conduct a “community health assessment” every three years to determine what 
needs the community has unfilled. 	  
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act also modified Form 990, the IRS tax 
form exempt organizations use (29). In 2007, the IRS created a new portion of the form, 
Schedule H, to measure compliance broadly in nonprofit health systems (30). The new form was 
created in an effort to demand greater financial transparency from nonprofit health systems and 
to make regulatory standards less ambiguous (31). Form 990-H requires the nonprofit health 
systems to document various expenses incurred, such as “health professions education” and 
charity care, to show exactly how much each nonprofit was spending on community benefit (32). 
The PPACA has added more to the form, requiring that hospitals now conduct studies on 
community health needs, and submit a description of how they will go about fulfilling these 
health needs, with an explanation of why they are not meeting any needs left unaddressed (33).  
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Section I.B Theoretical Analysis: The Policy Justification for Nonprofit Tax Exempt Status	  
Policy makers are concerned that the current tax exemption for nonprofit hospitals is 
outmoded and provides perverse incentives (34). It encourages nonprofits to focus on 
expenditures rather than whether such expenditures yield any tangible results. Moreover, they 
encourage a race to the bottom. As any tax exemption shifts the tax burden to the rest of the tax-
paying community (35), there must be some justification for any tax exemption. Historically, 
hospitals justified their tax exempt status by providing charity care. With the number of 
uninsured in the US expected to decrease by 32 million people (36), charity care will recede 
further as a compelling justification, and some other justification is necessary if the exemption is 
to be maintained. The current “community benefit standard,” which was intended to replace 
charity care after the creation of Medicare and Medicaid (37), was not developed in toto, but 
instead accrued incrementally from IRS rulings, court orders, and subsequent legislative 
modifications (38), and therefore inconsistencies and ad hoc irregularities mar the standard (39). 
This ad hoc process created a standard that does not comport with the objectives of the policy it 
is intended to serve.  
As both the IRS and Congress have in the past put restrictions on what qualifies for this 
exemption, it follows that these entities need not be considered “sovereign” in the present day. 
Others have argued that the exemption is justified on the basis that what charities do falls outside 
of the appropriate tax base. For instance, some argue that without profit, there is nothing to tax 
(40). Nonprofit hospitals, like most businesses, do create profits that could be taxable. Similarly, 
others argue that donations to charities must be tax-exempt because they are not “income” for the 
person making the donation (41). This does nothing to support the tax-exempt status of 
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institutions that rely more heavily on user fees than donations, such as most modern health care 
providers.	  
The most robust justification for continuing the tax-exempt status of nonprofits is that 
nonprofits provide some form of benefit that the taxing body finds worth subsidizing in this way. 
This is most commonly called either the “quid pro quo” or the subsidy justification (42). This 
theory is also consistent with our understanding that some organizations, while completely 
nonprofit, do not merit government subsidies, as the “goods” they produce are actually contrary 
to public policy (43). The question of what goods are to be subsidized then ensues. The 
traditional (though problematic (44)) answer is that public goods, public services, and those 
private goods with large positive externalities should be subsidized by tax exemptions (45). As 
any tax exemption imposes a burden on the rest of the tax base, it is the rest of the tax base that 
should receive the benefits of the public goods the exemption provides (46). This means that the 
policy justification for subsidy via tax exemption at the local level is distinct from the 
justification at the federal or even the state level, and thus the standards put forth in the different 
tax codes should also be distinct (47). 	  
	  
Section I.C Case Law Analysis: Illustrative Cases 
The tax exemption for nonprofit organizations is justified in many ways, but they do not 
all apply equally to nonprofit hospitals. The earliest justification for such tax exemptions is 
found in the “sovereignty” theory, which holds that charities and religious organizations are not 
subject to taxation by their nature. This theory of tax exemption claims that it is not ethically 
permissible for states to tax charities, because the business of charities is outside the tax base. 
While, in the past, churches were considered outside the king’s realm, and thus immune from 
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taxation, in modern times this justification takes a more secular tone. For example, some claim 
nonprofits are not businesses, and thus not subject to the same tax regulation (48).  
A recent increase in litigation over nonprofit property tax exemption demonstrates that 
community benefit determinations on the local level can become contentious. In addition, on the 
state level, differences of opinion over which legal test to apply to determine tax-exemption are 
increasing. Two standards are emerging, with some states’ courts opting for institutional 
structure and nonprofit form as the dispositive criteria, whereas other states look to community 
benefit expenditure as an indication of an institution’s charitable activities.  
This analysis will be restricted to an examination of disputes over property tax for several 
reasons. One is that in recent years issues of the justification for tax exemption have played out 
vividly in state courts. Another reason this analysis is restricted to property tax exemption is that 
local property tax exemption disputes subject institutions to more exacting scrutiny because there 
is an immediate relationship between the institution and the people in the community in which it 
operates. There is also the closest tie between the performance of an individual institution and 
the well-being of a distinct population at the local level, making it easier for courts to analyze the 
effects of noncompliance (49). For that reason, an evaluation of community benefit on the local 
level is more amenable to rigorous accounting standards. 
Dialysis Clinic, Inc. v. Levin (50), a recent opinion of the Supreme Court of Ohio, is 
illustrative of the disputes that can emerge over whether a nonprofit health provider merits a 
property tax exemption. Dialysis Clinic Incorporated (DCI) is a nonprofit health provider 
incorporated under the laws of Tennessee. It operates a facility in Butler County, Ohio, which is 
the focus of this litigation. On December 22, 2003, DCI applied for a property tax exemption for 
the Butler County facility, and the tax commissioner denied it (51). DCI appealed to the Board of 
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Tax Appeals (52), which upheld the tax commissioner’s ruling. DCI appealed again to the 
Supreme Court of Ohio.  
 The dispositive issue on appeal in DCI v. Levin was whether the activities of its Butler 
facility were charitable, and thus whether the facility was entitled to an exemption under Ohio 
law (53). This particular facility lost $250,000 per year, but DCI as a whole had excess earnings 
of $6,306,492 in 2003 and $32,167,517 in 2004. While DCI had never turned an indigent patient 
away from the Butler County facility, it also had a policy that explicitly stated that indigent care 
was not a “charity or gift to patients,” and that DCI retained the rights to refuse to admit and treat 
a patient who cannot pay (54). Although DCI conceded that it provided no free or charitable care 
at that property, it contended that its 501(c)(3) status “militates heavily in favor of finding it to be 
a ‘charitable institution’” (55). DCI was unable to provide a monetary figure for the charity care 
that it gave (56), but it did report that the Medicare “bad-debt” write-off for all of its locations 
was $6.7 million, or 1.27% of all charges. The BTA did not accept this as charity care, but also 
stated that even if it were acceptable as charity care, it would be “insufficient to meet the 
charitable service standards required for exemption” (57). The BTA also rejected DCI’s 
contributions to kidney research because charitable status cannot be achieved vicariously (58). 
 The Ohio Supreme Court held that the fact that DCI’s policy allowed it to refuse care to 
the indigent rendered its activities non-charitable (59). In the course of its opinion, the Court 
expressed disagreement with DCI’s contention that federal 501(c)(3) status “militates heavily” 
for state charitable status. The Court stated that such an interpretation is inconsistent with the 
Ohio statute's legislative intent: “This expansive construction of R.C. 5709.121 is inconsistent 
with the legislative purpose behind its enactment and with ordinary principles of statutory 
construction...” (60). The court found that “DCI’s argument would conflate Ohio’s property-tax 
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exemption requirements with standards under federal law for tax-exempt charities” (61). With 
this finding, the court expressly delinked local property tax exemption in Ohio from federal 
501(c)(3) status. Referring to a previous opinion, the court stated, “Congress does not define the 
scope of charitable use under Ohio law” (62). The commissioner found, and the BTA affirmed, 
that some threshold of unreimbursed care was necessary to qualify for charitable status under 
Ohio law. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed, holding that “case law does not require a 
threshold amount of unreimbursed care” (63).  
Similar issues were at play in Wexford Medical Group v City of Cadillac, which the 
Michigan Supreme Court decided in 2006. In 2000 and 2001, the City of Cadillac assessed 
property taxes on the Wexford Medical Group, a 501(c)(3) entity providing health care in 
Wexford County, Michigan. Wexford is a “federally designated health professional shortage 
area” (64). The Wexford Group appealed its tax assessment to the Tax Tribunal, which upheld 
the assessment, finding that “serving 13 patients under the [charity-care] program in a two-year 
time period is not sufficient” to justify property tax exemption (65). The Wexford Group then 
appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the Tribunal’s 
decision, finding that the Wexford Group “failed to present evidence that its ‘provision of 
charitable medical care constituted anything more than an incidental part of its operation’” (66). 
The Court of Appeals also held that mere underpayment by Medicare and Medicaid does not 
make a service charitable, nor does simply providing service in an underserved area (67). 
 In its decision on Wexford Medical Group v City of Cadillac, the Michigan Supreme 
Court modified an existing test (68). The new test, which they applied, had the following parts: 
1) The real estate must be owned and occupied by the exemption claimant 
2) The exemption claimant must be a nonprofit charitable institution 
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3) The exemption exists only when the buildings and other property thereon are 
occupied by the claimant solely for the purposes for which it was incorporated 
(69).  
 
The Wexford group clearly met factors 1 and 3. It was only number 2, the charitable institution 
prong, that was in doubt. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the Wexford Group was a 
charitable institution (70), despite the de minimis expenditure on charity care for the relevant 
period (71). Most notably, the Court held that “if the overall nature of the institution is 
charitable, it is a ‘charitable institution’ regardless of how much money it devotes to charitable 
activities in a particular year” (72). As the Ohio Court found in DCI v. Levin, the Michigan court 
held that there can be no threshold of charity care for the purposes of non-profit tax exemption. 
Rather, it is the nature of the institution that is dispositive.  
In Provena Covenant Medical Center v The Department of Revenue (2010), the Illinois 
Supreme Court, facing similar issues, reached a conclusion that differs from the preceding cases. 
Provena Hospitals is a subsidiary of Provena Health, which was created when three Catholic 
health-care operations merged. Provena Hospitals is a nonprofit organized under the laws of 
Illinois, and is exempt from federal income tax (73). As a nonprofit, Provena Hospitals applied 
for a property tax exemption for the 2002 tax year for 43 parcels in and around Urbana, Illinois 
(74). The parcels were all registered under one hospital run by Provena Hospitals, the Provena 
Covenant Medical Center. The Director of Revenue found Provena to be ineligible for the tax 
exemption (75), despite an Administrative Law Judge’s recommendation to the contrary (76). 
Provena appealed to the circuit court, which reversed the Director of Revenue, and granted the 
tax exemption on both charitable and religious grounds (77). The Director then appealed, and the 
Illinois Court of Appeals found that Provena was not entitled to either a religious or a charitable 
exemption (78). Provena then appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois (79).  
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 The Supreme Court of Illinois dispensed with the religious exemption issue, stating that 
to qualify for a religious exemption “the property in question must be used exclusively for 
religious purposes” (80). To hold that Provena deserved a religious exemption merely because a 
church created Provena would be to exempt all church-owned businesses, no matter what 
services were provided (81). In particular, “medical care, while potentially miraculous, is not 
intrinsically, necessarily, or even normally religious in nature” (82). 
 The charitable question was more complex. The court used a five-part test (83), 
describing the characteristics of a charity thusly:  
1) It has no capital, capital stock, or shareholders;  
2) It earns no profits or dividends but rather derives its funds mainly from private 
and public charity and holds them in trust for the purposes expressed in the 
charter;  
3) It dispenses charity to all who need it and apply for it;  
4) It does not provide gain or profit in a private sense to any person connected 
with it; and  
5) It does not appear to place any obstacles in the way of those who need and 
would avail themselves of the charitable benefits it dispenses (84).  
 
No one of these factors was regarded as dispositive, but instead they were evaluated jointly. The 
court found that Provena easily met the first and fourth factors, as there was no sign of private 
inurement and it did not have shareholders (85). The court held that Provena failed on the other 
three factors. Provena’s income was almost wholly derived from patient fees, not donations. 
Moreover, the lack of charitable care made it impossible to hold that Provena dispensed charity 
to all who applied for it or that Provena did not put obstacles in the way of those who sought it 
(86). 
 The court also held that Provena did not meet the actual charitable use standard. The 
Illinois court had held previously that charity is “a gift…for the benefit of an indefinite number 
of persons…lessening the burdens of government” (87). Moreover, “[c]onditioning charitable 
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status on whether an activity helps relieve the burdens on government is appropriate,” (88) and 
“services extended for value received do not relieve the [s]tate of its burden’” (89). Charitable 
care at Provena was de minimis, and Provena did nothing to help patients learn about charity care 
options (90).  
 Provena is exceptional among recent court cases in that the plurality of the Court 
expressed the view that there is indeed a minimum threshold for benefit to the community, 
though it did not go so far as to state what that minimum is. There was only a plurality because 
two justices dissented in part. Therefore, the case does not provide a binding precedent (91). 
Those who dissented in part agreed that Provena failed the test for charitable status, but objected 
to the notion of a threshold (92). While no precedent emerged from this case, it nonetheless lends 
support to those who believe that there is a minimum amount of benefit or charity that is required 
for a non-profit to enjoy a tax exemption. 
 Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. presents similar issues over the 
justification for property tax exemption. Intermountain Health Care was a nonprofit corporation 
under Utah law that operated 21 hospitals. It also owned other subsidiaries, including at least one 
for-profit corporation. When IHC applied for tax-exempt status, the Utah County Board of 
Equalization found that two of IHC’s hospitals, the Utah Valley Hospital and the American Fork 
Hospital, were not eligible. The Utah Tax Commission then overruled the Board (93). In this 
case, it was apparent that IHC met the statutory requirements for a charitable hospital, but Utah 
County argued that the statutes under which IHC qualified violated the Utah state constitution 
and that under the constitutional requirements, IHC would not qualify as a charity (94). The first 
statute in question maintained that as long as a nonprofit does not engage in any private 
inurement, and is used for a charitable purpose, it qualified for a tax exemption (95). The second 
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statute expressly stated that “[p]roperty used exclusively for religious, hospital, educational, 
employee representation, or welfare purposes which use complies with the requirements of 
section 59-2-30, shall be deemed to be used for charitable purposes” (96). The Utah Constitution 
merely states that “[t]he property of the state, cities, counties, towns, school districts, municipal 
corporations and public libraries, lots with the buildings thereon used exclusively for either 
religious worship or charitable purposes … shall be exempt from taxation” (97). 
 The dispositive issue in IHC was a constitutional one, namely whether the Utah statutes 
impermissibly expanded the constitutionally defined meaning of “charitable purposes” when it 
made the sweeping generalization that all hospitals acted for charitable purposes (98). As the 
Illinois Supreme Court later held in Provena, the Utah Supreme Court held that charity requires 
the existence of a gift to the community, not just community benefit (99). The court used a six-
part test (100) to determine whether IHC was indeed using its property “exclusively for … 
charitable purposes” (101). The factors were: 
1) Whether the stated purpose of the entity is to provide a significant service to 
others without immediate expectation of material reward;  
2) Whether the entity is supported, and to what extent, by donations and gifts;  
3) Whether the recipients of the "charity" are required to pay for the assistance 
received, in whole or in part;  
4) Whether the income received from all sources (gifts, donations, and payment 
from recipients) produces a "profit" to the entity in the sense that the income 
exceeds operating and long-term maintenance expenses;  
5) Whether the beneficiaries of the "charity" are restricted or unrestricted and, if 
restricted, whether the restriction bears a reasonable relationship to the entity's 
charitable objectives; and  
6) Whether dividends or some other form of financial benefit, or assets upon 
dissolution, are available to private interests, and whether the entity is 
organized and operated so that any commercial activities are subordinate or 
incidental to charitable ones.  
 
The court emphasized that of these criteria, none was dispositive, nor were they necessarily of 
equal importance (102). It held that IHC met the first, fifth, and sixth criteria (103). The court 
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also held that IHC did not meet the second, third, and fourth (104). In particular, though IHC had 
a policy of treating everyone, regardless of ability to pay, due to the overall paucity of charity 
care (105) along with efforts to keep charity care levels as low as possible (106), the majority 
found that IHC was not in any substantive way different from a for-profit hospital (107). In 
doing so, the court also struck down the statutes as an unconstitutional expansion of the narrow 
exemption in the Utah Constitution (108).  
Two distinct patterns emerge from recent state-level property-tax litigation over 
community benefit. One is the view that institutional form is dispositive. States that take that 
view, including Michigan, Vermont (109), Tennessee (110), and Ohio, hold that, so long as the 
formalistic requirements are met, there can be no threshold for monetary expenditure on 
community benefit nor is there a need for any accounting of the population health outcomes 
achieved through such expenditures. Not only are these courts not interested in outcomes, they 
are not even interested in expenditures as predictive indicators of outcome. Other states have 
reached a nearly opposite conclusion. In the Illinois and Utah cases, the Courts showed some 
interest in outcomes, and in keeping with current practice were willing to accept input related 
measures (such as charity care expenditure and proportion of charity care) as indicia of 
community benefit. Even those indirect measures were deemed inadequate in both of these cases. 
Section I.D Analysis of the Empirical Literature: The Community Benefit Standard’s Perverse 
Incentives	  
Nonprofit healthcare providers try to maintain their tax-exempt status by touting many 
benefits. For-profit hospitals provide many of those same benefits (111). There is also a lack of 
consensus on whether nonprofits serve poverty-stricken areas that need additional care better 
than for-profit hospitals. While studies in the 1990s found that for-profits tended to operate in 
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areas with higher percentages of insured people (112), more recent research has shown that for-
profit hospitals are concentrated in the poorest sections of the country, specifically the South and 
West. As government hospitals are also far more common in the South and West, the market 
share of nonprofit hospitals is the lowest in these areas.  
Moreover, many nonprofits fail to provide sufficient community benefits. For example, 
nonprofit hospitals do not provide significantly more uncompensated care than do for-profits, 
and provide significantly less than government-run hospitals (113). Nonprofits actually provide 
less help for Medicaid patients than for-profits, and these patients often cost a hospital more than 
Medicaid reimburses (114). Some research-oriented hospitals have come under fire for 
inadequate emergency-room services, including the Cleveland Clinic (115).	  
The argument that many nonprofits offer to rebut the aforementioned criticisms does not 
withstand scrutiny. They claim that they provide other benefits, including research and jobs. 
Research may partially justify federal and state income tax exemptions; these benefits do little 
for the local communities that provide property tax exemptions to the nonprofits within their 
jurisdictions. For instance, while research is vital for medical progress on a national and global 
level, it does not provide a health benefit to the communities subsidizing research-oriented 
nonprofit hospitals with tax exemptions. Clinical trials needed for research provide some benefit 
to local communities, but such benefits are only incidental to the research endeavor and cannot 
constitute a quid pro quo for local tax exemption. At the same time, the argument that nonprofits 
provide essential jobs is fatuous, as any comparable nonsubsidized, for-profit corporation would 
provide similar levels of employment (116). 
One recurring claim regarding the benefits of nonprofit hospitals, that they provide 
distinct services that for-profit hospitals under-provide, is not sufficient. In particular, some 
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maintain that nonprofits provide a disproportionate share of vital services that are necessary for 
all, particularly poor and uninsured patients (117). That for-profits are not providing enough of 
these services is a market failure, and a correction of a market failure is a legitimate reason, on 
its own, for providing such as subsidy (118). Where for-profit hospitals control the greatest share 
of the market, and thus the market failure is likely to be the most severe, nonprofits actually 
decrease the amount of unprofitable services they provide (119). This prevents them from 
correcting the market failure. There is also mounting evidence that some nonprofits fail to live up 
to this ideal, and impose even more costs on their communities than they ameliorate (120). 
Subsidizing all nonprofits because they can or may lessen a market failure invites abuse of the 
nonprofit form.	  
As tax exemption currently relies on providing an unspecified amount of charity care and 
a non-quantified amount of community benefit, nonprofit hospitals have an incentive to provide 
as little community benefit as they can get away with. Because there is no threshold for input, 
and they are not held to account for outcome, they have an incentive to provide the minimum 
amount of input they believe to be defensible. The new IRS Form 990, schedule H may put some 
pressure on hospitals to provide benefits because of the scrutiny they may receive. Nonetheless, 
notwithstanding the moral pressure which might be brought to bear by outside scrutiny, as long 
as hospitals provide something above de miminis, they continue to receive the subsidy. The only 
thing that keeps this incentive from being zero is the indeterminacy of the threshold (121). The 
current standard imposes incentives that are orthogonal to the ostensible policy goals that 
animate the revenue ruling that brought it into existence.	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Part II: An Outcome-based Approach to Community Benefit 
Given the flaws in the current standard for tax exemption of nonprofit health systems, it 
is worth exploring alternatives. Part II.A describes alternative approaches and examines their 
feasibility and efficacy. This examination shows that some options would be counter-productive, 
while others could be effective but are exceedingly difficult to put into place, ranging from 
impracticable to all but impossible. While the proposal put forward in this manuscript may face 
difficulties, it is manifestly better than the other plausible alternatives. Part II.B argues that the 
tax incentives for nonprofit hospitals should promote social welfare directly, rather than 
promoting spending or a particular institutional form, and that this can be done by focusing 
explicitly on outcomes. Part II.C shows how this standard would provide a more meaningful and 
rational metric by which to evaluate such cases.  
 
Section II.A Possible Alternatives 
Practicability and efficacy constrain most alternatives to the current system. Furthermore, 
there is likely to be a great deal of resistance to any change, as nonprofit hospitals are entrenched 
actors and are likely to lobby against any such changes. This is a problem that is not amenable to 
an ideal solution. While the proposal put forward in this manuscript may face difficulties, it is 
manifestly better than the other conceivable alternatives. 
One option is appealing in its simplicity: Repeal the community benefit standard entirely 
and tax nonprofits. This could be imposed absolutely, eliminating the tax exemption entirely, or 
it could allow for incremental exemption based on some amount of community benefit. 
Alternatively, legislators could impose an excise tax on certain health services and use the funds 
to subsidize public health services. There would be considerable political opposition to enacting 
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this plan, and it is unlikely that there would ever be enough political will to overcome that 
resistance. Such a move would, in most meaningful respects, convert all nonprofits into for-
profits, and this might change the behavior of nonprofits in ways that could be 
counterproductive. There are some apparent benefits to nonprofits, in that they give a different 
profile of services than for-profits (122). For the reasons discussed above, this is an unattractive 
option. 
Professor Jessica Berg has proposed that population health interventions by nonprofit 
health systems would satisfy the community benefit test, and justify the continuation of the tax 
exemption (123). This would keep the current standard but encourage (via a variety of 
mechanisms) nonprofit hospitals to engage in population-based health measures, justifying their 
exemption. She suggests that communities institute “community health boards.” Such regulatory 
boards would cover the geographic area that would benefit from the property taxes of the 
hospitals within it. The board would prioritize the services that nonprofits must provide to 
maintain tax-exempt status, though it would not have the power to make tax-exemption decisions 
(124). The structure Berg proposes specifies that the board be made up of a “variety of local 
community members,” as well as members of the boards of the hospitals and representatives 
from social service agencies, including the local health board (125). The local community 
members would include consumers, community leaders, and representatives from the nonprofit 
community (126). Berg’s suggestion is compelling because it fits the traditional rationale for 
nonprofit tax exemption. It is also responsive to the normative justification for tax exemption.  
While Prof. Berg's proposal is compelling, it must overcome several problems to be 
practicable. One problem with her proposal is that it could result in boards requiring hospitals to 
provide services outside of their core competence. Hospitals, both for-profit and nonprofit, 
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provide interventional medical care and diagnostics; they are not public health agencies. Another 
problem with Berg’s proposal is that the recommended “community health boards” could be 
subject to regulatory capture, which would render them largely useless. Regulatory capture is the 
phenomenon in which industries and interests control the state bodies charged with regulating 
them (127).  Regulatory capture has been defined as "...the phenomenon whereby regulated 
entities wield their superior organizational capacities to secure favorable agency outcomes at the 
expense of the diffuse public" (128).  It is at its nadir when “regulation is acquired by the 
industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit” (129).  This problem arises 
because the benefits to the population are diffuse, while the benefits available to the industries 
are concentrated, thus causing those within the industry to pay more attention to the regulating 
board than the population at large (130).  
Indeed, if community health boards were created, and then members friendly to nonprofit 
hospitals dominated the boards, it could lead to even less accountability of nonprofit health 
systems and a further reduction in public benefit. Hospitals are likely to dominate the community 
health board, unless the board is strongly insulated from industry influence (131). Policy makers 
will find it difficult to fully insulate a local board from capture, particularly in a jurisdiction 
where the hospital is a major industry. If the board is democratically elected, then the nonprofit 
industry can motivate its employees and supporters to vote for and support those regulators who 
will be friendly to the hospital. Meanwhile, the general population is likely to be largely 
apathetic. It is well established that very few local elections are able to engage the entire 
electorate, due to resource constraints (132).  This difference in motivation between the entity 
and the wider population will influence the outcomes of elections in favor those who support 
institutional interests (133). Even if the board is not elected, the hospital will have leverage over 
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those elected officials who appoint the board members (134). Moreover, industries have many 
more methods available to influence regulators, including gifts, offers of jobs, and relationships 
with board members (135). Many nonprofits operate in a number of different markets, and thus 
would be subject to a patchwork of regulations. The geographic power of these boards will have 
to be delineated carefully, as well as the activities of the nonprofits. Otherwise, one nonprofit 
might be required to conform to contradictory imperatives, if it falls into multiple community 
jurisdictions.  
While Regulatory Capture is a serious problem for various areas of regulation, it is not an 
intractable problem.  Various theories have been advanced by scholars from a number of fields, 
including law, economics and political science, to address this issue by devising means of 
reducing or eliminating the effects of capture on agency decision-making (136).  For instance, 
Rachel Barkow has posited that four factors that go “…beyond the conventional mechanisms to 
address additional design features that have largely gone under the radar of administrative law 
scholarship[]” (137) could be particularly effocatious in addressing capture.  The design features 
she identifies are “an agency's funding source; qualifications for appointment and post-
employment restrictions for agency officials; the agency's relationship with other federal 
agencies; the agency's relationship with state-level actors; and various political tools, including 
the agency's ability to generate politically powerful information, its ability to recruit political 
benefactors, and the potential for public advocates to become part of the agency structure” (138). 
Both Barkow’s suggestions regarding agency structure and the engagement with public 
advocates could be of particular relevance if new institutional structures are developed to make 
community benefit determinations.   
66 
 
An additional problem with Berg’s proposal is that the continuing consolidation of the 
nonprofit health sector may exacerbate problems of capture. Larger, more centralized nonprofits 
are more capable of capturing regulatory bodies than smaller ones and will, through better 
organization, be better able to engage in rent-seeking behavior by steering policymaking towards 
creating monopolistic privileges (139).  Captured community benefit boards might set the 
community benefit bar at a level that only a large institution could fulfill, thus removing 
competition. The likelihood of regulatory capture with a lack of an outcome-based accountability 
could be fatal for Berg’s scheme. Indeed, it might lead to outcomes that are considerably worse 
than the consequences of the current regime. 
 
Section II.B Forging an Outcome-Based Approach  
A basic understanding of the way that law can shape economic incentives leads to the 
conclusion that there should be a different legal regime, which could be implemented through 
regulatory action on the federal and state level, but might also require state-level legislation 
comparable to what has already been passed in several states. This new regime would create 
appropriate incentives while also being consistent with a more robust theoretical justification for 
tax exemption (140). Even in the absence of a clear policy agenda, systems of taxation inevitably 
change individual and institutional behavior because of the incentives they create (141). As was 
shown in Part I, the existing standard of tax-exemption creates perverse incentives. 
An outcome-based approach would focus on measurable benefits to the health of 
populations. In contrast, the current community benefit approach focuses on expenditures, 
without any evidence of their efficacy or adequacy. Such an outcome-based approach has the 
advantage that it can be consistently applied at the federal, state, and local levels, and yet still be 
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sensitive to context. For instance, the data yielded by form 990 schedule H disclosures could be 
compared to epidemiological data corresponding to the catchment areas of hospitals, no matter 
how narrow or broad they might be. Thus, it can reach different determinations at the various 
levels, depending on the nature of the benefits that the institution provides and where they are 
directed. An outcome-based standard requires that the local community receive the necessary, 
tangible and measurable benefits of the exemption (142). Appropriate metrics may vary 
depending on the health needs of the community. In time, longer-term measures of morbidity and 
mortality could be used. These would be even better ways of accounting for health outcomes, 
though they would have to be measured over a longer time scale. While medical education and 
research would continue to provide a partial justification for the federal, and perhaps state, 
exemptions, the outcome-based community benefit standard would provide the essential 
touchstone for establishing the charitable nature of nonprofit healthcare providers. On the local 
level, it could serve as the sine qua non for tax exemption. 
Shaping incentives for nonprofit health systems encourages them to maximize social 
welfare. While regulatory bodies, particularly at the local level, may be able to identify the 
community’s needed health services, these bodies are unlikely to know the best method for 
nonprofits to provide these services and even whether the nonprofits can do so efficiently. This 
constraint can be removed, and social welfare maximized, by providing a subsidy that is 
conditional on the achievement of certain outcomes. Such a subsidy system would allow 
institutions to choose whether to receive it, which would encourage them to make the most 
efficient choice (143).  
The sine qua non of tax exemption for nonprofits should be positive evidence of 
demonstrable public inurement (144). To qualify as public inurement an activity must take the 
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form of a material effort to promote the health and welfare of the community; such an effort 
must also be amenable to empirical verification of its efficacy. An outcome-based standard 
should not merely be an accounting of the dollar value of an activity that might benefit the 
public, but rather demonstrable evidence of a benefit that has accrued to the public. Such efforts 
must have reasonable prospects of efficacy and be amenable to empirical measures of success. 
This is consistent with the old common law notion of charity (145), and in that way is an appeal 
to precedent. An outcome-based standard is also desirable because it provides appropriate 
incentives to perform, not merely to spend.  
Principles of population health can provide both a framework for devising appropriate 
interventions for hospitals to engage in, as well as a lens through which the outcomes of such 
interventions can be viewed and evaluated. The term population health has taken on a variety of 
meanings throughout the public health and health policy literature. One cogent definition of 
population health is “the health outcomes of a group of individuals, including the distribution of 
such outcomes within the group” (146). Recent innovations in the study of population health and 
the convergence of public health and health services provides a means by which nonprofit 
hospitals could provide broad-based community benefits and readily document the health 
outcomes brought about by such activities. The attraction of a population-health oriented 
outcome-based standard are manifold. By focusing on whole populations rather than on 
individual charity care, hospitals can provide truly public goods (147). A revamping of the 
community benefit standard could also yield compliance-related benefits for hospitals by 
replacing the current murky community benefit standard with something more amenable to 
verification. If the value of community benefit activities can be measured via their outcomes, and 
positive outcomes are the touchstone for compliance, then under an outcome-oriented approach 
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hospitals will be able to know clearly whether or not they are in compliance with the 
requirements they bear as a result of their nonprofit status.  
A critic could mount three challenges to this standard: 1) the accounting standards would 
be unduly burdensome for non-profit hospitals and 2) measuring outcome is impractical and 3) 
even when outcomes can be measured, it will be difficult to attribute outcomes to specific 
hospitals. The first criticism does not withstand scrutiny, because under the new accounting 
standards mandated by the PPACA, hospitals already must conduct community needs 
assessments (148).  
The second does not withstand scrutiny either. Scholars have already provided 
compelling examples of ways to mount community-based interventions (149), and have shown 
the measurable differences in health outcomes among different systems (150). There are many 
ways to approach population health, most all of which can be usefully employed (151). 
Nonprofit hospitals can reduce negative externalities and increase positive externalities relative 
to the current system (152). The easiest way to do this is to increase the amount of preventive 
care provided to the population. The present failure to engage in prevention is a market failure 
because the current market incentives make it more profitable for healthcare providers to 
perform costly operations and surgeries after the fact, rather than provide relatively inexpensive 
care to prevent problems. Prevention activities are easy to target to specific populations. For 
example, the Denver school district, in conjunction with local health care providers and funding 
groups, is focusing preventive health care on adolescents (153). They have created school-based 
health centers (SBHCs) (154). Researchers recently studied these SBHCs and found that they 
were very successful in reducing the number of student emergency-room visits (155). In other 
locations, SBHCs have immunized students, protecting the overall population from 
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communicable diseases (156). The New York State Department of Public Health, with the 
assistance of several other agencies, created Breast Health Partnerships (BHPs) to screen low-
income uninsured and underinsured women for breast and cervical cancer (157). The BHPs also 
provide diagnostic testing and treatment support for those who test positive (158). A majority 
(51%) of the 40,000 women screened had never had a mammogram (159). The University of 
Illinois at Chicago Department of Public Health, Cook County Hospital, and the Chicago 
Department of Public Health created similar interventions directed at African American 
communities (160). They focused on teaching women how to do self-examinations and promoted 
free cancer screenings (161). Both interventions were successful in increasing the number of 
breast health screenings each population received. 	  
Health care providers can also assist in preventing outbreaks of communicable disease 
(162). They are well equipped to help public health departments contain epidemics and treat 
those who are affected. Hospitals are well placed to treat the earliest infected and to keep 
statistics on those exposed (163). In turn, the local health department can help immunize the 
community and limit overall exposure. In the 1990s, the New York State Department of Health 
and the Mt. Sinai Hospital worked together in this way to combat tuberculosis (164). Together, 
the hospital and the department created “TB directly observed treatment” to help those afflicted 
with TB properly care for themselves. Many of those afflicted were homeless or HIV+, and thus 
presented special difficulties in treatment. All those who began the program either completed it 
or were finishing at the time of the study (165). The study found that the program greatly 
improved the health of the indigent population of New York.	  
Regarding the third critique, the Mt. Sinai example, discussed supra, serves as a 
demonstration of how a coordinated program can succeed in reaching individuals in need.  
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However, it also highlights the obstacles one can face when attempting to attribute changes in 
population health to the efforts of a single program or health system.  Without a coordinated 
approach from the health department and hospital, this program would not have been as 
successful as it was.  When the a goal is to measure the individual effects of a hospital on a 
community to determine non-profit tax status, one must take care to develop an approach which 
ensures that outcomes are appropriately linked to the institution providing services. 	  
The third critique is in many ways the most problematic as inferring causation from 
population health data can be challenging.  It is, nonetheless, overcomeable.  Econometric 
analysis of a program’s population health outcomes is a methodologically difficult task.  
Measuring successes in population health takes time.  Even large longitudinal studies with 
statistically significant findings can be subject to confounding outside factors.  An example that 
illustrates several of these assessment challenges is the Class of 1989 study performed by the 
Minnesota Heart Health Program (MHHP), which followed students exposed to an educational 
initiative over a thirteen year period, assessing weekly smoking rates of participants as compared 
to a reference population.  The intervention was performed over a five year period. While a 
significant decrease in weekly smoking rates among intervention participants was observed, 
researchers did note possible confounding of outcomes: “[a]t issue is whether the lower onset 
rate in the intervention community was due to some cause other than the intervention, and 
whether the increase in smoking in the reference community was as high as it was due to some 
cause other than the usual high school secular trend” (166).  Even the best designed 
observational studies are subject to confounding by outside inputs such as economic factors, 
social pressure, and additional programs that could have an effect on the measured outcome 
(167).  Even the geographic area may have an effect on the desired outcome, creating another 
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possible source of bias or confounding.  These “neighborhood effects” on population health 
prompted one investigator to opine that “Ideally, [population health studies] should include 
sufficient numbers of neighborhoods and sufficient numbers of individuals per neighborhood to 
allow examination of within- and between neighborhood variability in the outcomes and in the 
factors associated with them” (168).  Defining exactly what a neighborhood is and what 
healthcare services reach a population is challenging. In the modern healthcare system, to 
meaningfully evaluate the effects of a public health-oriented program one must disentangle the 
effects of a single institution’s efforts in the context of overlying institutional catchments and 
populations consisting of individuals who seek treatment from multiple health systems (169).  
Ongoing population health surveys, such as the as the National Health and Nutrition 
Examination Survey (NHANES), one of the largest studies of population health in the United 
States, which has been active from the 1960’s to the present, are only designed to measure the 
overall changes in population health trends, not to attribute them to one institution or another 
(170).  Several large studies that rely on NHANES data on diabetes and coronary heart disease 
do make note that even significant statistical inferences on the data could be influenced by 
complex population factors, not by simple causation (171, 172).  	  
It is true that it will be challenging, at least at first, to reliably link hospital performance 
to population-health outcomes.  At present we do not have a good set of population-based 
outcome measures.  The lag between policy initiative and the development of appropriate metrics 
is an oft-encountered issue in health policy.  Similar challenges were faced when the first major 
pushes for quality improvement were initiated (173). In time, however appropriate metrics were 
developed.  A similar pattern will likely follow in this area as the measurement of population 
health is already an active area of research. In the area of nonprofit tax exemption, one way to 
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deal with the problem of measurement and attribution is to begin by focusing on things that we 
can readily measure at present, in particular intra-institutional factors within the four walls of 
hospitals and then gradually shift to outcome-related measures as such metrics become more 
accessible and reliable.  Thus, a population-health approach could be implemented in the near 
term by adapting tools from the Pay For Performance (sometimes abbreviated as P4P) 
movement.  In the longer term, as population-based measures improve, the focus could shift 
increasingly to true measures of the population-level contributions of hospitals to the public’s 
health.  	  
 Pay for performance systems for hospital quality improvement can provide a structure 
that could be applicable to the evaluation of nonprofit hospital tax exempt status as a measure of 
population health improvement. Pay for performance programs in healthcare have ranged from 
small HMO-based provider programs, to national quality improvement programs that endeavor 
to influence all hospitals that received reimbursement from government sources and have been in 
use in healthcare for more than 20 years (174). The structure of pay for performance systems 
varies, but the goal is frequently the same: fiscally reward providers for measurable quality 
improvement beyond a specified  threshold (175).   
While pay for performance systems are now common in modern healthcare, they have 
taken different forms, each with its own challenges.  There are numerous examples of both 
private sector and government-based pay for performance programs that have yielded 
improvements in quality process measures.  Studies on one of the largest federal programs, the 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid services (CMS) Premier Hospital Quality Incentive 
Demonstration, showed improvement in evidence-based quality measures relating to Acute 
Myocardial Infarction (AMI), pneumonia management, and total hip and knee replacement 
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surgery. Of the approximately 450 hospitals in this program, those institutions which showed 
improvement in these measures received reimbursement bonuses of up to 2% (176).   
Statewide pay for participation and performance quality programs are another area where 
improvements in quality have been demonstrated.  These programs are particularly important as 
they can be the incubators for best practices and quality improvement in discrete regions which 
then, if successful, can be implemented on a larger scale.  The Hawaii Medical Service 
Association’s (HMSA) collaborative on Coronary Heart Disease is an example of a regional 
collaborate that used a pay for performance model to make rapid improvements in process 
measures (177).  Facilities eligible to participate in this program had to have 30 admissions 
annually for acute coronary heart disease.  Thirteen hospitals were enrolled and tasked with 
implementing quality process guidelines dictated by the American Heart Association.  The 
majority of the hospitals complied with the process improvement initiatives after one year of 
implementation and four of the facilities displayed 85% compliance with these best practice 
measures, which lead to additional reimbursement (178).   
Such evaluations could be done in the context of data-sharing partnerships, such as the 
recently developed successful enterprises known as Multistakeholder Regional Collaboratives.  
These sorts of partnerships have already been shown to be an effective way of improving quality, 
as a recent investigation found that "collaborative[s’] reporting activities to be positively 
associated with improvement on a number of reported quality measures" (179).  To conduct such 
evaluations to determining tax exemption status, one could utilized validated measures endorsed 
by organizations such as the National Quality Forum (180) and the National Committee on 
Quality Assurance (181).  In particular, the Healthcare Effectiveness and Data Information Set 
(HEDIS) (182) has proved to be a valuable tool for conducting institutional evaluations (183).  	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Another notable regional collaborative that has demonstrated quality improvements using 
a pay for performance model is the Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (BCBS) Collaborative 
Quality Initiative (CQI). This program includes 14 programs that all hospitals participating 
within the Blue Care Network and provide certain services are invited to participate in (184). 
Currently, over 80 hospitals are participating in at least one of these collaborative, the first of 
which was launched in 1997 (185).  Each of these programs has an individually-tailored model 
that evolves over time.  Hospitals are first invited and paid for participation in the program, then 
the focus is shifted to pay for performance process initiatives, and ultimately patient outcomes.  
Throughout every stage of the collaborative, the  focus is on sharing data, best practices, and 
collective teamwork that drives a regional focus to achieve each of the collaborative’s goals.  
While many of these programs are new (some only within the first five years of their inception), 
they have already yielded promising evidence of quality improvement.  For example, hospitals 
participating in a vascular intervention collaborative demonstrated improvement in AMI process 
measures, such as proper medication dosing after an event, measures that have shown to have a 
significant effect on patient outcomes and to effect marked reduction in costs (186).  
Collaboratives that focus on general and vascular surgery improvements have demonstrated a 
significant decrease in risk adjusted morbidities from 2005-2009 compared to other hospitals in 
Michigan (187).  As more of these Michigan collaboratives shift into pay for performance 
measures, there will be additional evidence with which to rate the effectiveness of such 
programs, though the initial evidence already looks promising. 
While there is some evidence supporting the effectiveness of pay for performance 
programs, it also has some notable drawbacks.  Physician based pay for performance programs 
have been criticized for only compensating already high performing practitioners, rather than 
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rewarding performance improvement (188).  There is only limited evidence of the efficacy of 
pay for performance programs that attempt to tie quality improvement measures with tangible 
patient outcomes or overall improvement in patient disparities (189).  There is also evidence 
indicating that pay for performance initiatives may not even be able to demonstrate accurate 
improvements in process measures because of other inputs into the quality improvement system 
such as public reporting of quality metrics, though a review of the CMS Premier program did 
find that there were more significant improvements in quality process measures in the pay-for-
performance CMS Premier group then other facilities that were only publically reporting their 
data (190, 191).   
Hospital Value Based Purchasing (VBP) is one of the most ambitious pay for 
performance programs in the United States mounted to date.  It began in 2012 in the early stages 
of the implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA).  This program, with its notable 
successes, may serve as a model for how the kinds population health improvement metrics 
needed for an outcome-based approach to community benefit can be derived. The initial goals of 
hospital Value Based Purchasing (VBP) as outlined in the ACA and implemented by CMS are 
simple: provide incentives for quality patient care as opposed to the standard model of higher 
reimbursement for higher throughput (192).  Over 3,000 hospitals with inpatient services nation-
wide are eligible for CMS hospital VBP in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.  VBP 
through CMS is a budget-neutral program, achieving payments for its results by taking a portion 
of reimbursement off of the top of hospital diagnosis-related group (DRG) payment (starting at 
1% in FY 2013 and moving to 2% in FY 2017 and beyond) and redistributing this amount so that 
top performers are rewarded, while others are not reimbursed for their full costs (193). This 
small percent is not trivial. With an estimated $1.4 billion dollars slated for redistribution in FY 
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2015, inpatient facilities must demonstrate improvement in the stated measures quickly, or be 
forced to give up critical reimbursement dollars.  Hospital VBP incentives are not only derived 
from a combination of meeting threshold quality measures, but continuous improvement from 
baseline period to performance period on a rolling basis. The VBP target is fluid from year to 
year, not only in terms of what performance targets need to be reached, but also via shifting 
overall from a process-based to an outcome-based system, with certain measures phasing in and 
out each year (194).  For example, the “Clinical Process of Care” measure domain of VBP in FY 
2013 was 70% of the total VBP weight and was constituted by quality processes, such as 
antibiotic prophylaxis prior to surgery and distribution of discharge instructions.  By fiscal year 
of 2017, the “Clinical Process” domain will be worth only 5%, with the majority of the VBP 
reimbursement directed towards measures of patient outcome such as post-operative infection or 
mortality.   
CMS’s hospital VBP system, despite its many strengths, is vulnerable to some of the 
same critiques mounted against other pay for performance programs.  First, the measures chosen 
for VBP have allready been in use in payer and HMO based pay for performance programs for 
some time (195).  These CMS-directed National Hospital Inpatient Quality Measures all militate 
toward support of evidence based practice such as the process measures outlined by the Joint 
Commission’s Surgical Care Improvement Project (SCIP), a project that has looked for 
measured quality improvement in surgical process in Joint Commission certified hospitals since 
2004 (196).  Second, the measures on which VBP is gauged are, in most instances, publically 
reported and have been so for years (197). This can correct for some of the competitive effect 
seen from provider based pay for performance programs.  These measures have helped to rank 
hospitals in public forums, such as in the Hospital Compare system, a consumer website 
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regulated by CMS that allows the user to compare facilities based on quality measures (198). 
Third, the budget-neutral aspect of VBP allows for only minimal additional cost to provide 
incentives for the participants in the program.  Fourth, the two tiered payment structure of VBP 
also helps to correct for inequity of payment to institutions for higher quality and gaming of the 
quality measure system.  Hospitals will need to show continuous improvement to gain back full 
payment from the VBP system.  For example, if a top performing hospital, which has always met 
a threshold for a quality measure, does not show distinct improvement in the measure each year 
in the VBP cycle, it will not be fully compensated for the measure.  This system also rewards 
underperforming hospitals that are demonstrating improvement, even if they are not meeting 
thresholds for these measures.  This rolling system of measure for VBP performance also helps 
to eliminate gaming of the quality system.  For example, a hospital can display artificial 
performance improvements in a quality measure if documentation errors are addressed 
surrounding that measure (199).  A hospital will have to make actual quality improvement 
changes based on best practices to demonstrate continuous, sustainable improvement in this 
measure to achieve its full VBP earning potential. While there are incomplete data documenting 
the effectiveness of this new CMS hospital VBP program, the system could be used as a guide 
and incubator for quality improvement metrics to drive population health improvements.  
Regional collaboratives such as the Hawaii or Michigan models or a small federal pilot program, 
such as CMS Premier, are examples of ways to test a sample system before moving to a large 
program that would encompass all non-profit hospitals. The incentive for these population based 
improvements and performance on outcome measures could be connected to non-profit status, 
rather than reimbursement.   
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  An alternative, though related, framework for community benefit evaluation could be to 
model determinations of tax exemption on the hospital licensure process (200).  Both to avoid 
issues of capture and to mitigate the measurement problems associated with an econometric 
approach to measuring outcomes and attributing them to particular institutions, one could draw 
upon the field of program evaluation to conduct detailed, qualitative and quantitative evaluations 
of hospital’s population health activities.  It is worth considering whetehr attribution should not 
be based on statistical inferences of causality but, rather, on a deeper qualitative effort by trained 
personnel who look at the total efforts of a hospital and its accomplishment much the way 
accreditation works. This could be an adjunct or, at least in the short-term, alternative to actual 
outcome-measurement.  In such a context, attribution would not be nearly as problematic as via 
econometric means  because the focus is largely on services the hospital is providing within its 
four walls.   
An outcome-oriented standard could be implemented administratively, legislatively, or 
both, and is therefore practicable. On the federal level, a new revenue ruling could implement 
this administratively, accompanied by modification of Form 990-H to accommodate accounting 
standards that would provide information about the effects of the community benefit activities. 
To reduce the burden on institutions, this could be evaluated on a longer-term interval (e.g. every 
3 to 5 years) to allow time for interventions to show effect. On the state level, depending on the 
restrictions imposed by states' statutes and constitutions, this could be done either 
administratively by a state revenue agency, or legislatively through state (or, in some cases, 
local) legislation. This would accommodate the current fragmentation of authority over 




Section II.C: Implementation  
 The community benefit standard for nonprofit hospital tax exemption should be both 
expanded in scope and revised in substance.  It should be focused more on actual health 
outcomes rather than structural criteria, particularly those that relate to population health in 
accordance with national priorities as reflected in the ACA.  In previous chapters, I have made 
the argument that the community benefit standard as it currently exists is out of step with the 
contemporary health needs of communities.  Presently, the standard is very focused on structural 
matters (such as whether a hospital has a community-oriented board and an emergency 
department).  It needs to shift to outcome-related criteria, or, at least, include outcome-related 
parameters along with structural criteria.    
Because of the challenges inherent in measuring community-based health outcomes, and 
the even greater challenges posed by the task of attributing such outcomes to the efforts of 
particular hospitals, identifying a limited set of quantitatively-measureable  health outcomes for 
assessing the population-level benefits of hospitals is not feasible.  There are, however, other 
ways of assessing the potential population health contributions of hospitals that are both feasible, 
and, likely to yield meaningful data which could be used to shape hospitals' activities so they 
better serve the public interest.  The model I propose is one based on current methods for the 
accreditation and licensure of health care organizations.  It would be part of a regular evaluation 
cycle for community benefit compliance that would both use the current disclosures made via 
Community Health Needs Assessments (abbreviated as CHNAs) and Form 990 data, as well as 
"on the ground," detailed evaluations of qualitative and quantitative data gathered via site visits 
by specialized contractors.  The key features of this model are: (1) a revised exemption standard 
focused on indicia of community-based health outcomes, (2) the conduct of site visits to assess 
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hospital’s contributions to community based health outcomes relative to IRS criteria and based 
on both quantitative and qualitative data, and (3) the IRS will retain sole authority to make 
determination of exempt status based on the site visit findings and other relevant data.  The site 
visits will be done to gather a variety of qualitative and quantitative data from hospitals to assess 
what they have done over a defined period of time to contribute to their respective communities' 
health status, as well as what those contributions have achieved in terms of improved health 
outcomes. 
In principle, the IRS could conduct site visits itself.  However, doing so would require it 
to build a large staff of professionals with detailed knowledge of program evaluation.  A 
potentially more tractable way to implement a population health-based framework for purposes 
of hospital tax exemption determinations would be for the IRS to contract with specially-
equipped organizations, which could perform site visits and institutional evaluations to gauge the 
adequacy of the community benefit activities of nonprofit hospitals.  Under such a model, the 
IRS would be the customer of the contractor, not the healthcare entities which are to be 
examined.  This should help to assure independence and objectivity in the evaluation process.   
The aforementioned model would require a revision of the current IRS community 
benefit standard, and, thus, the likely issuance of a new revenue ruling. As noted above, such 
independent evaluators could draw on the data now being collected via Form 990 Schedule H 
and the Community Health Needs Assessments. Similar to an accreditation or licensing model, 
these organizations could perform regularly-scheduled site visits (perhaps on a biannual or 
triannual schedule).  They also could engage in ongoing or annualized review of institutional 
data, such as those forms of information disclosed in the CHNAs.  The IRS could engage in 
notice and comment rule-making processes to provide a framework for how these tasks will be 
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contracted out, what sorts of qualifications and resources the contractors will need to have, and 
most importantly, how the results provided by the contractors will be evaluated by the IRS's own 
personnel, and what process a hospital would have available for appealing an adverse decision.  
The outside organizations would gather and summarize data, conduct analysis and generate 
reports, and, possibly, issue recommendations regarding a hospital's nonprofit status.  Under this 
model, the IRS will review the results provided by the contractor as it gauges whether nonprofit 
status should be conferred or maintained.  Nonetheless, final determinations regarding an 
institution’s federal tax exempt status will, as now, be under the sole jurisdiction of the IRS.  The 
role of the non-governmental entity will be purely assistive and advisory.   
 The object of such a relationship between the IRS and outside contractors would be to 
facilitate on the federal level a move toward an accreditation-type process of community benefit 
evaluation.  Under such a model, to maintain nonprofit status, an institution would need to do 
more than merely document its activities on paper.  Rather, both their submissions and their 
activities should be subject to a rigorous mechanism of evaluation.  There is already considerable 
pressure from states and localities for greater disclosure of data regarding hospitals' activities and 
expenditures.  The model being advanced here is in keeping with this trend and may well benefit 
from the momentum that has already been generated.   
 One key consideration is what kind of criteria the contractors will look for during their 
site visits.  Criteria could be drawn from previously validated population health-related 
parameters which have been established by independent organizations.  For instance, the 
National Quality Forum (NQF) has endorsed a set of standardized, scientifically evaluated 
indicators that hospitals can use to assess population-health performance (201).  The NQF 
indictors have been systematized and made publically available through a searchable database 
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(202).  Similarly, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality has developed an array of 
probative indicators, such as measures of preventable admissions, which could be utilized to 
evaluate the efforts of hospitals at improving population health (203).  These include: the long-
term and short-term complications admissions rates for diabetes, asthma, chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease (COPD), as well as the admission rates for low birth weight, dehydration,  
hypertension, heart failure and uncontrolled diabetes.   
 In addition, the site visit teams could qualitatively examine the health promotion 
activities of hospitals to ensure that they comport with established best practices.  The measures 
need not be fully standardized across hospitals.  They could be, at least in part, customized to fit 
the hospital's community activities.  Careful examination of the CHNA will be key to this 
process. The first step will be to profile the community's health needs based on the information 
gathered by the hospital in the CHNA, as well as other publically available data.  The next step 
will be to ask certain key questions pertaining to the hospital's community benefit activities and 
whether, and how, they address the unmet needs.  Some key questions could be: 
• What were the identified needs? 
• What has the hospital done to address these needs? 
• What has been the plan to address needs? 
• What measurable results can the hospital put forth?  
• How has the hospital engaged with the local public health infrastructure to monitor health 
status?  
• Has the hospital has developed a community health surveillance infrastructure that allows 
the hospital to monitor health status of its community?  
• What kind of community initiatives has the hospital done? 
• How has the hospital engaged the community or undertaken in outreach?  
• How much has spent on these activities?  
 
No one criterion will be dispositive.  Rather, the goal is to provide a holistic picture of the 
hospital's activities which will provide transparency for the community, as well as a rich data set 
for qualitative analysis.  At the very least, such an inquiry will make it very easy to identify if 
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hospitals are not doing anything to meaningfully address their community benefit 
responsibilities, or not taking this requirement seriously. 
	  
Section II.C.1: Relevant Institutional Players 
	  
 As discussed above, one potentially attractive option for implementing a revised 
community benefit framework is the establishment of new relationships with private sector or 
nonprofit contractors.  Under such an arrangement, the IRS would, as now, remain the central 
institutional player in nonprofit hospital tax exemption.  The IRS would develop specific criteria 
for what it expects from hospitals relative to a revised community benefit standard, such as a 
requirement that hospitals must demonstrate how they are contributing to the actual improvement 
of the most critical health issues in their community as identified in their own CHNA.  The IRS 
will also be responsible for developing an evaluative process, as well as making final 
determinations based on the site visit findings.  It will promulgate specific criteria that will be the 
basis for such evaluations.  For instance, it might require that hospitals demonstrate how they are 
contributing to the actual improvement of the three most critical health issues in their community 
based on their own CHNAs.  
 While the IRS would specify the evaluative process, and ultimately evaluate compliance, 
the process of conducting the site visits could be accomplished via a relationship with contractors 
with relevant skills and expertise.  The contractors might be existing non-governmental 
organizations, or, perhaps, new non-governmental organizations constituted expressly for the 
purpose of implementing this initiative.  The third-party NGO entities could be existing 
contractors with specialized expertise in the healthcare industry, such as the RAND corporation, 
the Altarum Institute, or similar bodies.  They would undertake both the qualitative and 
quantitative aspects of the evaluation of hospitals’ community benefit activities.  This would 
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include reviews of the CHNAs and form 990-H reports generated by hospitals in addition to 
periodic site visits to assess qualitatively the nature and efficacy of the hospital’s community 
benefit activities.  The evaluations made by this body will be ongoing, on a cyclical basis, rather 
than a one time event.  The contracted nongovernmental organization will make 
recommendations regarding exemption status based on a review of the site visit and the data 
disclosed by the hospital.  However, authority over final determination of nonprofit status will 
remain with the IRS.  
 As a matter of federalism, state and local taxation authorities have great latitude to set 
their own standards for tax exemption.  As such, this proposal for reform of the federal standard 
for nonprofit hospital tax exemption, if implemented, would not affect state and local tax 
exemption directly.  It might, however, have a significant indirect effect on state and local tax 
exemption.  Currently, many states "piggyback" on the federal standard; if an institution is 
deemed to be in compliance with the federal standard by the IRS, the state tax authorities 
automatically deem them to be in compliance with their requirements as well.  Under a reformed 
community benefit standard, states could be free to continue to rely on federal determinations as 
they do now.  However, they also could choose to enact more exacting standards and use the data 
generated by the federal evolution process to gauge compliance with requirements calibrated to 
met with their own needs and expectations.   
 The IRS, could, and should, freely share the results of the site visit evaluations it 
commissions with state and local authorities as well as the public at large.  The information 
could therefore be used by state authorities to not only monitor the current community benefit 
activities of hospitals under their jurisdiction, but also to gain insight into the health needs of 
their communities and whether they are unmet.  Such information might prove influential if the 
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state or locality should choose to set standards for exemption that more closely suit their 
communities' health needs and policy priorities.   
 
Section II.C.2: Comparison with Previous Proposals  
 The above-mentioned proposal for implementation of community benefit reform would 
have a number of advantages over Berg’s proposal for locally-constituted boards.  Not least 
among these advantages is that it would be less prone to capture.  Hospitals have tremendous 
political power in their local communities as they are large employers with significant economic 
effects on their local communities.  While hospitals as an industry have a lobby nationally, it 
cannot compare but it does not compare to what happens locally.  As such, locally-constituted 
boards could be particularly prone to capture.  
 Under the model I'm proposing, the contactors will be hired by and accountable to the 
IRS, not the hospitals they examine.  Costs associated with site visits will be imposed on to 
hospitals via a special assessment, but the nonprofit institutions will not have any latitude in 
selecting the contractor or defining the parameters by which they are examined.  Having the 
government as the customer should reduce the tendency for the contractors to be captured by the 
nonprofit industry.  
 A central problem with Berg’s approach is that by involving local boards it will create a 
hodge-podge of expectations with no uniformity or guarantee of fundamental fairness.  
Moreover, her approach effectively pushes the IRS to the sidelines of the exemption process, 
though it has been an integral part of the tax exemption process for decades.  Also, her approach 
does not address at all how such evaluation will be done.  She also does not address whether her 
approach is for income or property tax exemption. The only nod she makes to these issue is by 
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positing that the community benefit boards will send a report to the IRS.  Her approach will 
cause a lack of uniformity nationally, and raise issues of fundamental fairness.  
 Berg suggest that the locally-constituted boards would be able to make determinations 
regarding local property tax exemption eligibility.  Nonetheless, she does not provide procedures 
for ensuring that the boards do so is a systematic manner.  She also fails to explain how an 
adverse determination by a board could be appealed or contested.  This combination of sweeping 
power and lack of accountability could lead one to be  concerned that she has designed a kind of 
"star chamber" courts for the heath care industry.   
 The foremost advantage of reforming community benefit via a revised IRS standard is 
that it will maintain the current level of national uniformity.  As this process of reform 
progresses, it will be important to institute protections to avoid institutional capture by the 
healthcare industry.  To that end, the IRS should seek input from a diverse array of relevant 
stakeholders from the public health and consumer advocacy communities, in addition to the 
healthcare industry as it formulates its new policy.  At a minimum, it should create an advisory 
board to provide input on the new regulations that has strong representation from consumer 
groups, academics and health care experts who are independent of the hospital industry. 
  
Section II.C.3: Criticisms that Critics Could Mount and Responses to These Potential Concerns  
 A number of potential criticisms could be mounted against the aforementioned approach 
to the implementation of community benefit reform.  One potential concern is whether such a 
proposal could be politically viable, particularly in this present time of highly charged partisan 
gridlock, which could make the passage of new federal legislation a potentially difficult 
undertaking.  However, on the federal level, much of the necessary reform could likely be done 
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under existing legislation through administrative action via notice and comment rule-making or 
other like means.  It is worth noting that the adequacy of community benefit provision by 
nonprofit hospitals has attracted attention from both the political left and right.  Thus, even if 
new federal legislation is required, it might prove more politically viable than it might at first 
seem.   
 Another challenge for the kind of model being advanced is that it will admittedly be 
costly, particularly in the initial stages as assessment criteria are established and verification 
mechanisms are refined.  The costs will most likely need to be borne by the nonprofit hospitals 
via a special assessment.  This will have to become another element of a nonprofit hospital's 
operating expenses.  While this will be an imposition, it also comes with significant financial 
benefits in the form of tax exemptions; most all of the studies to date on community benefit 
expenditures have found that the financial benefits that nonprofit hospitals receive via tax 
exemption far outstrip the costs they incur as a result of their community benefit activities and 
compliance requirements.   
 The level of costs imposed on hospitals will depend on how frequently they will have to 
engage in this process and how intensive the site visit and information disclosure process will be.  
But not all that much additional work may be required beyond hospitals’ current data 
maintenance and disclosure activities.  Much of this data already has to be compiled.  Nonprofit 
hospitals may not get quite as good a deal as they are getting now, but it still will likely still be a 
very favorable bargain.  Such a venture could prove to be expensive, both in terms of the 
expenditures required to start up such an initiative, and in terms of the compliance costs for 
nonprofit hospitals.  However, such expenses may be offset by the increased public benefit 
achieved by such an approach.  
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 A final concern might be whether such an imitative will prove to be effective in its efforts 
to improve the provision of community benefits by nonprofit hospitals.  In terms of efficacy, 
such an arrangement will likely have some significant benefits over the community-committee 
model advanced by Berg.  Specialized contractors will have much greater resources in terms of 
human capital.  They will be able to recruit and train a highly skilled staff.  It would prove 
difficult for a diffuse collection of multiple local boards to develop the expertise and the 
infrastructure necessary to make informed decisions regarding population health needs.  This 
would prove to be much less of a challenge for an ongoing national-level initiative.   
	  
Section II.D: Application of An Outcome-Based Approach To Illustrative Cases 
An application of an outcome-based approach to the cases described above, makes the 
significance of the change in standards becomes clear. For example, in Wexford v. City of 
Cadillac, given the de minimis provision of charity care (204), and the complete lack of evidence 
of demonstrable change in population health outcome and reduction in government health-
related expenditures (205), under an outcome-based approach the Wexford Medical Group 
clearly would have lost its property tax exemption. The fact that the clinic was in a federally 
designated “health professional shortage” area (206) need not alter that conclusion. Losing the 
tax exemption would not necessarily cause the Wexford Group to move out of the area, and even 
if it did, the void might draw in a new clinic that could comply with the standard, and thus enjoy 
the tax exemption.  
The case Dialysis Clinic, Incorporated v. Levin, hinged on the question of DCI’s 
institutional form and policy. The dispositive question was whether having a policy that allowed 
DCI to turn away indigent persons, though it had never done so, disqualified it from exemption 
(207). Under an outcome-based approach, a court might have come to the same conclusion 
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though via different reasoning and on a stronger conceptual footing. The case shows some 
evidence of charity care, but it is poorly documented (208). DCI did not do much to reduce the 
burden of government, as private or public insurance compensated DCI for most its care (209). 
An outcome-based approach would have led to a more meaningful and rigorous analysis of this 
case. The inquiry would have been focused on what DCI achieves for the public, not an abstruse 
question of whether it had the appropriate institutional structure in its charter.  
In Provena, the Illinois Court came to the right conclusion, but for the wrong reasons. 
Provena lays out a test much stricter than that in use by the federal government or most other 
states, but it still does not offer the right incentives. It looks only at institutional form and a 
minimum threshold of charity care expenses (210), rather than any indicators of health 
improvement in the community that provides the subsidy. There is no evidence of health 
promotion or other benefits to the community, and thus the court was right to strip Provena of its 
tax-exempt status (211).    
In Intermountain Health Care, the statute regarding charitable tax exemption only 
addressed institutional form and purpose (212), whereas the Utah Constitution only mentions 
“charitable purpose” (213). This suggests, if not outcome, at least charitable function is the 
essential consideration. The Utah Supreme Court held that Intermountain Health Care did not 
have a charitable function, because the hospital provided no more community benefits than a 
similar for-profit (214). This reasoning militates towards an outcome-based approach, but the 
outcome is problematic. Much like the IRS in 1969, the Utah Supreme Court made policy 
without considering what incentives it was putting into place for nonprofit health systems (215), 




Given the problems evident with the standard for tax exemption of nonprofit hospitals on 
the federal, state, and local levels, a reevaluation of these standards is timely. An outcome-based 
standard would provide greater analytic clarity and conceptual cogency to determinations of tax-
exemption. It would more closely adhere to the policy rationale for nonprofit tax exemption, and 
likely also increase social utility by providing better calibrated incentives for the provision of 
public benefit. Recent changes in federal reporting requirements make it feasible to institute an 
outcome-based approach on the federal level through administrative means, and on the state and 
local level administratively or legislatively. In this way, an outcome-based approach is also 
practicable, which adds to its appeal. This new standard is consistent with precedent in that it 
harkens back to the traditional common law notion of charity. Therefore, an outcome-based 
approach merits further consideration by state and federal legislators and officials as an 
alternative to the current standard for tax exemption of nonprofit healthcare providers.  
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Together, the three papers of my dissertation constitute a cohesive whole. The first 
provides a comprehensive review of the problem of community benefit and the empirical, 
theoretical and policy literature generated by this problem. The second chapter posts a possible 
policy solution to the problem and examines the challenges and promises such an approach could 
bring. The final chapter examines the legal changes which would be necessary to bring about 
such a policy changes and explores how such legal reform could be brought about. It then 
presents the regulatory and legal ramifications of such a change.  
 One future direction which I would like to explore to build upon the research conducted 
for this dissertation, is to examine empirically the relationship between the features of state-level 
community benefits laws and the provision of community benefits by nonprofit hospitals. 
Despite policymakers’ efforts to ensure that nonprofit hospitals provide adequate benefits for the 
tax exemptions received, little is known currently about the relationship between state-level 
community benefit reporting requirements and nonprofit hospitals’ provision of community 
benefits. As a result, it is unknown whether nonprofit hospitals act in a manner consistent with 
the normative justification for tax exemption. The few existing empirical studies in this area 
provide evidence from a number of states that the implementation of a community benefit 
reporting requirement increases hospitals’ provision of uncompensated care but fail to establish a 
relationship between reporting requirements and nonprofit hospitals’ community orientation and 
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other community benefit initiatives. I would like to conduct research to provide empirical 
evidence of the effect of state-level community benefit reporting requirements on nonprofit 
hospitals’ provision of community benefits for a nationally representative sample of U.S. 
hospitals.  
I am interested in answering a variety of research questions related to the community 
benefit standard for a nonprofit hospital tax exemption. Using the Form 990 data and American 
Hospital Association survey data, combined with my own coding of state level community 
benefit laws and their disclosure provisions, I hope to answer the question of whether these laws 
have an effect upon the provision of community benefits by nonprofit hospitals, what effects 
those are, and how they are mediated. From the initial descriptive statistics that have been done 
thus far, it seems that state level community benefit laws do indeed have an effect on the 
provision of both clinical and nonclinical community benefit services by nonprofit hospitals. 
One important research question that I hope to answer is whether the mechanism for this 
increase in provision is the prospect of public disclosure and scrutiny of the hospital’s activities 
or whether it is the hospital’s own awareness of the needs of its community. To use an 
interpersonal analogy, the question is whether the changes in community benefit provision are 
mediated by “shame” or by “guilt.”  That is, is it the prospect of negative attention in popular 
press or other public venues, governmental scrutiny, or other kinds out outside pressure that 
encourages hospitals to provide more community benefits?  Or is it that the process of being 
forced to evaluate the health needs of their communities and the expenditures that they devote to 
community benefit provides hospitals with insight into the needs of their populations, and 
thereby changes their patterns of spending on community benefit activities? 
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 Further aspects that I would like to elucidate include whether the process of engaging in a 
Community Health Needs Assessment, often abbreviated as CHNA, is associated with increase 
level of community benefit expenditures. Community Health Needs Assessments are mandated 
under the Affordable Care Act for nonprofit hospitals. However, there is not yet a solid 
evidentiary foundation for the efficacy of this mandate as a policy intervention. Examining 
whether this policy made a difference before the introduction of the Affordable Care Art could 
therefore be illuminating. Even before the mandate of Community Health Needs Assessments in 
the Affordable Care Act, they were mandated by state laws in a variety of different states. 
Comparing provision levels in those states that had Community Health Needs Assessment 
requirements and those that did not could provide a natural experiment to examine their efficacy. 
 This project would expand the work of prior studies by: (1) broadening the notion of 
state-level community benefit reporting requirements to include both legislation and litigation; 
(2) employing a broader definition of community benefits that focuses not only on charity care 
but also includes measures of other community benefit activities; and (3) examining a nationally 
representative sample of U.S. hospitals. 
 
 
